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Abstract 
Traditional environmental policy instruments have not always proven successful in fostering 
environmentally friendly behaviour. The question remains: how can policymakers tackle the 
attitude-behaviour gap when it comes to pro-environmental choices and sustainable life-
styles? One solution that has emerged is green nudging, a new and potentially promising 
policy tool born of behavioural economics and experimental psychology. This paper contrib-
utes to the current discussion surrounding green nudging with an extensive overview of the 
subject and the establishment of a policy evaluative framework, which, in addition to incor-
porating the criteria, efficacy and effectiveness, focuses on the commonly neglected dimen-
sion of ethics. A preliminary policy evaluation of two types of nudging — defaults and social 
norms — suggests that while green nudging has proven to be both efficacious in laboratory 
settings and effective in real life, there remain many ethical concerns that must be ac-
counted for in the implementation of this new policy instrument. Policymakers may be able 
to use these insights to further develop green nudging as a means to promote pro-environ-
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The concept of nudge originates from the seminal and equally popular book by Richard Tha-
ler and Cass Sunstein of the same name. Less than a decade after the book’s publication in 
2008, nudging has exploded as a contentious topic of discussion in public policy circles, such 
as health, taxation, consumer protection, energy and the environment. Apart from sparking 
nearly a decade’s worth of lively debate among academics and practitioners alike, nudging 
throws a screw into traditional policymaking by challenging the longstanding classical eco-
nomic paradigm that views humans as perfectly rational beings.  
Imagine you are a visitor at the beautiful Yosemite National Park in California. A sign greets 
you at the trailhead imploring you not to give food to the wildlife. It explains further that 
each year thousands of hikers feed the park’s small fauna, which become dependent on 
hikers’ charity. You begin your hike and intend to obey the sign. Yet, less ecologically con-
scious people may perceive ‘thousands of hikers’ as an invitation. Clearly everybody is feed-
ing the wildlife; indeed, what is one additional person? Due to the powerful influence of 
perceived social norms, the sign’s unfortunate wording may lead to an increase in the unde-
sirable behaviour! A clever park administer would instead design a sign that frames feeding 
wildlife as both uncommon and deviant. Thousands of visitors amount to a drop in the bucket 
for a park that welcomes nearly four million eager tourists annually, and no one wants to 
belong to the 2-5% of people who harm the local animal populations. Framing the way in 
which information is displayed can go a long way to solving many environmental problems 
(Cialdini et al., 2006). 
Like the sign in the example above, a nudge, as defined by Thaler and Sunstein (2008), is 
any “aspect of the choice architecture that alters people's behaviour in a predictable way 
without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives” (p. 6). 
Thaler and Sunstein (2008) advocate for nudging as a ‘libertarian’ form of paternalism, 
claiming that it is legitimate to try to influence peoples’ behaviour to make their lives 
longer, healthier and better — as long as they judge themselves to be better off and their 
freedom of choice is preserved (p. 5). However, nudging as policy is also unique for its foun-
dation, not in law, political science or economics but rather in the behavioural sciences. 
In the past, studies on human behaviour were relegated to disciplines such as sociology or 
psychology. However, over the past two decades, behavioural science has crossed bounda-
ries and increasingly found entrance into other fields, such as economics and policymaking. 
In the course of this development, limitations on human rationality have been integrated 
into economic models and new research areas have mushroomed, such as behavioural eco-
nomics, behavioural finance and behavioural game theory (Croson & Treich, 2014, p. 335). 
Through the implementation of nudging in policymaking, citizens can be steered in a desir-
able direction without having to enforce unpopular rules or regulations. State governments 
may stand to benefit from the findings of behavioural research by avoiding contentious reg-
ulations, bans or taxes and instead gently nudging individuals to save energy, drive more 
slowly, eat healthier or — in short — to become better citizens. 
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In 2010, the United Kingdom (UK) was the first to establish a Behavioural Insights Team (BIT) 
— also called the ‘nudge unit’ — within its Cabinet Office.1 The purpose of the BIT was to 
examine how behavioural science findings can tailor public policy to stimulate citizens to-
wards pro-social behaviour, e.g., saving energy or paying taxes. Three years later, following 
the British example, President Barack Obama signed an executive order establishing the 
White House Social and Behavioral Sciences Team, the ‘US nudge unit’. Obama himself ex-
plained in a statement: “Adopting the insights of behavioural science will help bring our 
government into the 21st century in a wide range of ways — from delivering services more 
efficiently and effectively to accelerating the transition to a clean energy economy; to help-
ing workers find better jobs, gain access to educational opportunity, and lead longer, health-
ier lives” (Office of the Press Secretary, 2015, p. 1). In Germany, the topic drew attention 
at the end of August 2014 when Chancellor Angela Merkel advertised three open behavioural 
insights positions to be housed within the Federal Chancellery. The public reaction was scep-
tical and some in the media painted the move in a negative light, with one headline in the 
German magazine Die Welt bluntly commenting: “Merkel wants to educate Germans with a 
nudge” (Dams, Ettel, Greive & Zschäpitz, 2015).  
With more and more governments exploring ways to nudge citizens, opposition has swelled 
both in academic and public discourse. Many critics label nudging as a patronising and dubi-
ous form of control by which the state, lacking any democratic mandate, psychologically 
manipulates its citizens. Others argue that nudging exploits human weakness and shapes 
behaviour through opaque means, thereby raising complex ethical questions. Yet, common 
lines of criticism might not apply to all forms of nudging equally. Moreover, because nudges 
can be used to pursue different ends, depending on the goal or targeted behaviour, some 
nudges may be on more solid ethical ground than others. For instance, what about public 
policy aims that are supported by the majority of the population and important for the well-
being of society, such as environmental protection? So-called green nudges function in the 
same way as nudges in other policy fields but specifically seek to encourage more sustainable 
and ecological lifestyles (Centre d’analyse stratégique, 2011, p. 1). Due to the dire, global, 
and even ‘super wicked’ nature of many environmental problems, is there a special argu-
ment to be made for green nudging (Levin, Cashore, Bernstein & Auld, 2012, p. 123)?  
The present research centres on the question: Should we nudge for the environment? Much 
of the literature critical of nudge-based policies approaches the topic more broadly, exam-
ining all policy fields, but far fewer researchers assess nudging solely in the context of envi-
ronmental policy. Nevertheless, nudging — whether for the environment or to pursue any 
policy aim — is an incredibly nuanced and complicated concept that deserves a careful and 
meticulous treatment. For one, nudging raises numerous ethical questions that either do not 
                                            
 
1  In 2014, the BIT became a social purpose company, but it is still partially owned by the 
Cabinet Office. For more information, visit: http://www.behaviouralinsights.co.uk 
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exist or are relatively straightforward for other policy instruments — e.g., taxes are a trans-
parent means of behavioural control that do not diminish autonomy and personal agency, 
even though they can be inappropriately applied. The current paper serves first and foremost 
as a guide to help make sense of and assess all the existing positive and negative facets of 
green nudging systematically. Accordingly, this paper’s primary objectives are (1) to synthe-
sise and interpret the growing literature on green nudging, (2) present the current state of 
the art and existing practical applications of nudging and (3) establish a framework to eval-
uate the suitability of green nudging as an environmental policy instrument. In sum, with his 
paper we offer a synopsis of the most relevant and topical debates about green nudging as 
well as a rubric by which to evaluate this new policy tool. 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the emergence of behavioural 
economics and how it serves as an empirical foundation for nudging. In this initial section, 
we also touch on the political philosophy of libertarian paternalism as well as the primary 
criticism and controversies surrounding nudge-based interventions.  Section 3 turns the focus 
to green nudges. First, we examine the nature and complexity of environmental problems 
and the policy solutions traditionally used to take them on. We then place nudging in the 
context of the traditional environmental policy toolbox, highlighting how it is fundamentally 
different. In the latter half of Section 3 we propose a typology of green nudges and discuss 
the various categories using existing examples. Finally, at the end of Section 3 we revisit our 
research question against this theoretical and practical background.  
In Section 4 we introduce the methodological approach used to develop a framework for 
evaluating green nudges. We then guide the reader through the proposed evaluative frame-
work explaining the three chosen criteria: efficacy, effectiveness and ethics. We conclude 
this section with a discussion of methodological limitations. Section 5 serves as a preliminary 
evaluation of two types of green nudges — green defaults and green social norms. Each nudge 
type is assessed using the three criteria that comprise our framework. Finally, in Section 6 
we discuss the outcome of the evaluation and embed our findings in the broader context of 
the current debate on green nudging and effective environmental policymaking. The discus-
sion underscores the importance of evaluating nudging from an ethical angle and outlines 
recommendations for possible future research in the field. Section 7 concludes.  
Compared to other policy instruments — such as effluent taxes and regulations — which have 
been around and in use for decades, nudging has only just recently emerged in environmental 
policy circles. Born of pioneering advances in the psychological and cognitive sciences, it is 
no wonder, however, that policymakers are just now beginning to discuss nudging as a pos-
sible alternative. Still, to adequately address fundamentally political questions about the 
suitability of green nudging, it is crucial to understand the scientific reasons why and how 
nudging changes human behaviour. The evaluative framework we propose takes these em-
pirical foundations of nudging into account and is designed to be used by policymakers and 
other relevant stakeholders pursuing nudge-based interventions to pressing environmental 
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problems. It is our hope that by critically outlining the scientific foundations, practical ap-
plications and ethical considerations of green nudging as a new environmental policy tool, 
this paper will provide valuable input into the on-going debate. 
2 Background: A theory of nudging 
Nudge theory is founded on a rich and established body of empirical research in the behav-
ioural sciences, notably experimental psychology and behavioural economics. This research 
has shown that small, unnoticeable changes to the context in which a decision is made can 
dramatically alter ensuing behaviour. Some of the more famous examples of nudges in prac-
tice include, the placement of a fly decal at the bottom of men’s urinals to reduce cleaning 
costs, changing the renewable energy option default from ‘opt-in’ to ‘opt-out’ and the in-
clusion of a frowny face emoticon on electricity bills for households with exorbitant energy 
usage (Allcott & Mullainathan, 2010; Costa & Kahn, 2013; European Commission, 2016; Mom-
sen & Stoerk, 2014).2 According to Thaler and Sunstein (2008), a nudge is defined as any 
element of the decision-making environment that influences choices without restricting op-
tions. Hence, as per their definition, the authors also introduce the topic with a political 
and philosophical twist, the crux of their thesis centring upon a freedom-preserving frame-
work for public policy termed libertarian paternalism.   
Libertarian paternalism, while seemingly an oxymoron, is any policy that upholds freedom 
of choice by unobtrusively guiding people towards a desired behaviour and thus can be con-
sidered a form of ‘soft paternalism’ (Sunstein, 2014, p. 20). In Nudge: Improving decisions 
about health, wealth, and happiness, the two authors claim that public policy-induced 
nudges do just this; they change behaviour without restricting or regulating options (Thaler 
& Sunstein, 2008). However, in the years since the 2008 publication, an expansive literature 
has emerged on the topic with many authors pointing out that nudging and libertarian pa-
ternalism, while related in theory, are not one and the same in practice (see for instance 
Barton & Grüne-Yanoff, 2015; Hansen, 2016; Hansen & Jespersen, 2013; Lepenies & Małecka, 
2015; Mitchell, 2005). Indeed, Hansen and Jespersen (2013) discuss the differences between 
the two concepts at length, arriving at the conclusion that “while nudging is a means to 
promote behavioural change, libertarian paternalism is a guide, or a series of constraints on 
what ends may be promoted” (p. 12). As we will see, these and other critical treatments of 
nudging have helped reshape and add nuance to the discourse surrounding nudge theory. 
A further distinction must be made between nudging as a policy tool to influence behaviour 
and so-called behavioural insights for policymaking more generally. Behavioural insights re-
fer to behaviourally informed input into the policymaking process that helps tailor policies 
to the psychological realities of the human condition (European Commission, 2016, p. 10). 
                                            
 
2  Refer to Section 3.3 for a more exhaustive list of green nudge examples as well as a 
typology 
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Thus, all nudges can be considered behavioural insights, insofar as they are the result (or 
output) of behaviourally informed policymaking; but not all behavioural insights are nudges. 
We contend that a comprehensive theory of nudging necessarily consists of two distinct con-
cepts: (1) nudging as a psychological mechanism for guiding individuals’ choices, informed 
by insights from the behavioural sciences and (2) the political philosophy of libertarian pa-
ternalism, which can — but need not always — serve as a guiding framework for the use of 
nudging in public policy. In our policy evaluation, we focus exclusively on the former, that 
is, green nudging as a tool or means to encourage sustainable and ecological behaviour, and 
we justify this approach in Section 3.4. However, the following will also outline in brief the 
tenets of libertarian paternalism.  
This section is divided into two parts. First, we discuss the emergence of behavioural eco-
nomics — the marriage of economics and experimental psychology — as a challenge to the 
classical economic model of rational human behaviour and how it serves as an empirical 
foundation for nudging. Second, we investigate the crucial differences between nudging and 
libertarian paternalism and explore how nudging can in theory be employed within a liber-
tarian framework. Finally, we touch on some of the primary criticism of nudge theory and 
nudging in practice. 
2.1 Nudging and its foundations in the behavioural sciences 
Behavioural economics is a rapidly developing field at the nexus of cognitive psychology and 
economics, which upholds that a more comprehensive understanding of human cognition can 
inform, augment and enhance economic concepts (Thaler, 2000, p. 137). Since its inception 
in the mid-1900s, behavioural economics has come to play a prominent role in the policy-
making of countries all over the world and, more importantly for our purposes, serves as the 
cornerstone of nudge theory. 
2.1.1 Econs and Humans 
For years, orthodox economic thinking has centred on a theory of rational choice, i.e., the 
notion that when it comes to making important as well as mundane decisions, humans are 
rational, calculative agents with stable preferences. Based on Daniel Bernoulli’s essays on 
subjective utility in the 18th century and fine-tuned by John von Neumann and Oskar Mor-
genstern, into a series of axioms on expected utility theory in the mid-20th century, the 
assumption of rational choice informs the neo-classical economic analysis of policymaking — 
e.g., fiscal, monetary, health and environmental — to this day (Grüne-Yanoff, 2007, p. 353).3 
                                            
 
3  Expected utility theory holds that you can measure an agent’s preference for different 
prospects by the amount of risk he or she is willing to take on to obtain them. A pure 
prospect signifies zero risk or 100% certainty that the desired outcome will occur. For 
instance, the consumption of a good is a pure prospect (i.e. an apple will always provide 
a consumer with the associated amount of utility), while purchasing a lottery ticket is 
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Agents of the rational choice paradigm, sometimes called homo economicus or ‘Econs’, are 
omnipotent and consider all relevant information before making choices that inevitably pro-
mote self-interested ends (Thaler, 2000, p. 133; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 6). However, 
while the field of economics embraces the theory of rational choice or expected utility — 
both normative in nature — to explain how individuals should arrive at decisions, these rigid 
models are inconsistent with how the social and psychological sciences view human nature 
— i.e., positive or descriptive theories of decision making (Kahneman, 2012, p. 269; Thaler, 
2000, p. 137).4 Behavioural scientists know from extensive research that humans are in fact 
‘noisy’, unpredictable and (unlike machines) error prone even when it comes to their own 
best interests. Thaler and Sunstein (2003) go as far as to regard the historical assumption of 
perfect rationality in the field of economics as ‘tautological’. If relaxed to include psycho-
logical realities, many classical economic models would inevitably fall apart or cease to be 
valid (p. 176). 
The rational choice model began to fray in the second half of the 20th century with the 
introduction of bounded rationality. The term was first coined by Herbert Simon in his 1957 
book, Models of Man, but the author had already written extensively on the topic in earlier 
work, referring to ‘limited’ or ‘approximate’ rationality (see for instance Simon, 1955, p. 
114).  Unlike the prevailing theory, bounded rationality proposes that an individual’s ability 
to make rational decisions is subject to fundamental limitations, including inter alia the 
amount of information provided, the timeframe in which the decision must be met and in-
ternal cognitive restraints (Simon, 1972, p. 163). Expanding on this, recent research high-
lights the idea of ecological rationality, suggesting that individuals are confined by the en-
vironment in which a decision takes place (Gigerenzer, 2015, p. 374). It follows logically that 
this ecological/bounded notion of rationality is not a static concept and instead depends on 
context and circumstance. Therefore, while Econs operate under conditions of full rational-
ity irrespective of context, ‘Humans’ must cope with existential and environmental bounds 
to their own decision-making faculties (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 6). Econs and Humans 
represent fundamentally different views on human psychology, with the latter reflecting 
reality and the former a more idealistic model of behaviour based on a theory of rational 
                                            
 
not. The utility attached to the lottery ticket can be shown: (X1, p; X2, p - 1), where X1 is 
the utility derived from losing, p is the probability of losing, X2 is the utility derived from 
winning (based on the magnitude of the prize), and p - 1 is the probability of win-
ning.  Agents choose prospects to maximize their expected lifetime utility. Expected util-
ity theory has been the basis of economic thought since the end of World War II. (see 
Grüne-Yanoff, 2007, pp. 535-537 for a comprehensive explanation of expected utility the-
ory).  
4  By normative we mean that the theory of rational choice refers to the ‘ideal’ but non-
existent consumer; it predicts how people should behave as opposed to positive theories, 
which describe how people actually behave. See Thaler (1980) for an overview of this line 
of reasoning. 
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choice with its own merits for stringent mathematical modelling (Thaler, 2000, p. 137). As 
we discuss later in Section 3.2, the degree to which either paradigm is taken as an analytical 
basis for policymaking has important implications for which policy tools are favoured.  
Research in experimental psychology, such as the ground-breaking work by Nobel Laureate 
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, has identified a long list of ways in which humans fail 
to live up to the homo economicus or ‘Econ’ ideal. Prospect theory, for one, shows that 
humans are both loss averse — i.e., we dislike losses more than we like gains of the same 
magnitude — and risk averse — i.e., when it comes to gains we exhibit a preference for 
certainty over gambles, even when the gamble has a higher expected utility — (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979, p. 280, 1984, p. 342). Conversely, humans are risk seeking for potential 
losses. Unlike expected utility theory, prospect theory also demonstrates that individuals 
measure changes in wealth based on the status quo rather than end quantities of wealth. 
Consequently, humans are biased in their subjective reading of utility to attach undue weight 
to anything already in their possession — the so-called endowment effect (Thaler, 1980; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1991).  
Further research suggests that people think of their money in an organized way; that is, 
consumers budget planned expenses and attach emotions to these mental accounts (Thaler, 
1985). The concept of mental accounting explains why ‘sunk costs’ weigh so heavily in human 
decision making. For example, we are more likely to continue investing in a project that has 
already wasted a considerable amount of time and money than in a brand new one with the 
same chance of success because, unlike Econs, Humans are swayed by the need to justify 
past expenses (Kahneman, 2012, p. 345).  
The above examples represent a snapshot of the cognitive tendencies that underlie the field 
of behavioural economics and throw into relief the practical and theoretical limitations of 
expected utility theory. For their contributions, psychologists, Kahneman and Tversky, along 
with the economist, Richard Thaler, are generally credited as the founders of behavioural 
economics and by extension its application to policymaking (i.e. nudging). Nudge theory 
emphasizes primarily the internal, cognitive limitations common among all people (Schu-
bert, 2016, p. 3). Indeed, nudging is more than simply influencing behaviour without limiting 
options and may be more readily defined as the exploitation of bounded human rationality 
by either public officials or private enterprises (i.e. marketing and advertising) with the goal 
of influencing behaviour. Put slightly differently, a nudge is “any factor that alters the be-
haviour of ‘Humans’ (irrational, cognitively biased actors), even though it would be ignored 
by ‘Econs’ (rational actors)” (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 8). To fully grasp the built-in limits 
to human judgment and how nudge theory in turn makes use of bounded rationality to induce 
behavioural change, we must first take a look at the prevailing model of human cognition. 
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2.1.2 Dual process theory 
We spend our days transitioning from one choice to the next. Consciously or not, the human 
brain is perpetually in the business of making decisions. The principle set of theories under-
lying much of our current understanding of human cognition and decision making is known 
in conjunction as dual process theory (Evans, 2008, p. 255). Dual process theory describes 
two processes that interact to instruct the way we evaluate and select among options: an 
automatic, intuitive process and a reflective, deliberate process — hereafter referred to as 
System 1 and System 2, respectively (Evans & Stanovich, 2013, p. 244). Generally, System 1 
operates involuntarily and quickly, while System 2 consciously allocates mental effort and 
attention to carefully evaluate alternatives. It may be helpful to think of System 1 as impul-
sive and System 2 as just the opposite, cautious and planned (Kahneman, 2003, p. 698). 
A slightly different but related thesis is the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) for attitude 
adjustment and persuasion, which consists of the peripheral and central routes of infor-
mation processing (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).5 Similar to System 1, the peripheral route picks 
up on and responds to external cues of little personal interest when evaluating information, 
while the central route thoughtfully considers personally relevant alternatives, thereby ap-
pealing to System 2. Hence, the ELM arrives at many of the same conclusions as dual process 
theory, but from a slightly different angle. 
Generally speaking, System 1 and System 2 operate in concert, with conclusions drawn intu-
itively by System 1 often informing the calculative, attentive nature of System 2 (Hansen & 
Jespersen, 2013; Michalek, Meran, Schwarze & Yildiz, 2015). In other words, System 2 is 
there “to monitor and control thoughts and actions ‘suggested’ by System 1, allowing some 
to be expressed directly in behaviour and suppressing or modifying others” (Kahneman, 2012, 
p. 44). Thus, whenever an individual makes a decision — for instance, whether to select the 
renewable energy option from their local utility — both systems may engage (Momsen & 
Stoerk, 2014, p. 376). However, System 2 processes are slower to operate or may never kick 
in at all, thereby leaving many simple, everyday tasks to System 1. For this reason, in his 
book Thinking Fast and Slow, Daniel Kahneman refers to System 2 as “the lazy controller”, 
noting that volitional and analytical thinking requires mental effort (p. 39). In the renewable 
energy example, System 2 may not engage quickly enough to weigh and judge all available 
options — i.e., ‘yes/no, I want to source 50% of my electricity sustainably’ (Momsen & Stoerk, 
2014, p. 378). The decision is then left to System 1, which in this case is predisposed to stick 
with the status quo or whichever option is presented as the default. This status quo bias is 
                                            
 
5  Petty and Cacioppo (1986) showed in their research that information provision targeted 
at the central route of cognition (designed to appeal to personally-relevant internal and 
reflective processes) tended to have a longer lasting influence on attitudes and resulting 
behaviour. This may have implications for nudge theory. Nudges that function solely by 
influencing automatic behaviour — i.e., habit manipulation or what Hansen and Jespersen 
(2013) refer to as ‘Type 1’ nudges — may not have a lasting effect on behaviour.  
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one of many cognitive biases that System 1 falls prey to (we discuss biases at length in the 
following section). 
The dual processes of cognition are at the centre of nudge theory. Nudges as policy tools 
function first and foremost at System 1 levels of cognition, influencing automatic and invol-
untary behaviour and decision making (Hansen, 2016, p. 8; see also Grüne-Yanoff & Hertwig, 
2016). For instance, in the example above, nudging people by changing the default to the 
more sustainable option, has been shown to lead to a 20% increase in the purchase of re-
newable energy by households in experimental settings (Momsen & Stoerk, 2014, p. 380). 
Even though System 2 may remain latent at first, once engaged, it interacts with System 1, 
choosing either to ignore or use cognitive input from the automatic process. Thus, depending 
on how a nudge is designed, it can also indirectly influence the reflective and self-aware 
decision making of System 2 (Hansen & Jespersen, 2013, p. 15).   
A treatment of nudging that omits the basic premises of dual process theory leads to a “blur-
ring” in the definition of what constitutes a nudge (Michalek et al., 2015, p. 5). This may 
explain some of the inconsistency in the literature, which at times, struggles to pin down a 
single psychological definition of nudging (Hansen, 2016, p. 2). The current paper uses a 
definition of nudging based on the premises of dual process theory and assumes the position 
furthered inter alia by Hansen and Jespersen (2013), Schubert (2016) and Sunstein (2014) 
that nudges operate primarily via System 1 biases and heuristics but, due to interaction 
between the two systems, have the ability to affect more deliberate decision making. 
2.1.3 Heuristics and biases 
Sometimes System 1 becomes overloaded and relies on heuristics to cut down on the effort 
required to undergo a particular task. The psychological definition of a heuristic is any “sim-
ple [cognitive] procedure that helps find adequate, though often imperfect, answers to dif-
ficult questions” (Kahneman, 2012, p. 98). In other words, heuristics are mental shortcuts 
that function through so-called ‘attribute substitution’, which basically entails swapping a 
hard problem for an easier one (Kahneman, 2012, p. 97; Michalek et al., 2015, p. 5). For 
example, if asked to estimate the probability of a given event occurring, few people will 
employ System 2 to search out the needed information and complete the necessary calcula-
tions. Instead, most will judge something else (not probability) and still provide an answer 
in probabilistic or quantitative terms. Kahneman (2012) points out that in the majority of 
cases willingness to pay paradigms used to appraise, e.g., environmental issues exemplify a 
heuristic at work (p. 98). If a person is asked how much he or she is willing to pay to save a 
neighbourhood green space from development (hard question), they may unconsciously con-
sider the emotions they associate with the place (easy question). It is plain to see that Sys-
tem 2 must not engage to provide an adequate answer, even in monetary terms. A high 
degree of positively valenced emotion in this instance will inevitably lead to a higher will-
ingness to pay. This affect heuristic describes how judgments are made based on the emo-
tions attached to alternatives (Slovic, Finucane, Peters & MacGregor, 2002). Perceived emo-
tion associated with a given choice serves as a substitute for cost-benefit or quantitative 
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analysis and prompts a situation in which the person’s “likes or dislikes determine their 
beliefs about the world” (Kahneman, 2012, p. 103). 
In addition to the affect heuristic there are three principle heuristics that affect human 
judgement: availability, representativeness and anchoring (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
• The availability heuristic suggests that when making a judgment, people generally rely 
on that which easily comes to mind either because of personal or temporal salience. For 
example, the decision to buy fire insurance (a probabilistic judgment) is influenced by 
the experience of witnessing a neighbour’s house on fire or watching a house fire on the 
news.   
• The representativeness heuristic occurs when an evaluation is made based on how simi-
lar two events or instances seem as well as whether one belongs to or originates from 
the other. A clear example here is the propensity, even among statisticians, to consider 
correlation as evidence of causation. Just because two phenomena are on similar trajec-
tories does not imply they are intrinsically related, much less causally related. 
• The anchoring (and adjustment) heuristic explains how judgments are made by beginning 
with an initial value and then adjusting to obtain a final answer. For instance, if asked 
to estimate the population of Essen (a medium sized city in central Germany), an indi-
vidual may begin with a known value (e.g. the population of Berlin) and adjust down-
wards to come up with an approximation. 
Similar to how at first promising shortcuts can lead one astray while out for a walk in un-
known territory, these and other heuristics often lead to biases or systematic flaws in our 
thinking (Ölander & Thøgersen, 2014, p. 344; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, p. 1124). The 
availability heuristic, for instance, explains a bias towards cognitive ease, i.e., that which 
can be recalled or processed easily is more likely to be factored into decision making. Kahne-
man (2012) refers to this phenomenon broadly as ‘WYSIATI’ or ‘what you see is all there is’, 
claiming that it serves as the basis for three additional biases: (1) overconfidence in the 
quality of judgments, (2) base-rate neglect (i.e. failing to abide by Bayesian reasoning) and 
(3) framing effects (p. 82).6 
                                            
 
6  Thomas Bayes’ rule of probability demonstrates how knowledge of base rate statistics 
(i.e. fundamental distributions within a population) can be combined with other more 
specific statistical observations about the population to arrive at a more accurate esti-
mate of an occurrence or phenomenon. For example, to estimate the probability that a 
given individual belongs to a specific group (e.g. engineering students at University X who 
are female), you must first account for the base rate (e.g. 1 in 10 students studies engi-
neering at University X). Only then you can take other statistical information into account 
(e.g. there are 2x more male than female engineers). (See Kahneman, 2012, p. 154 for a 
more in-depth explanation of Bayesian probability.) 
FFU-Report 01-2017: Green Nudging 11 
 
 
Framing effects are caused by the way in which available information is presented, which at 
times can lead to less-than-rational decisions. One famous example is the Asian Disease Par-
adigm described by Kahneman and Tversky (1984). In two separate instances, the research-
ers asked participants to choose between programmes to combat a hypothetical deadly out-
break in Asia. For the first choice, Programme A ensured that 200 people would be saved 
and Programme B entailed a one-third chance that 600 people would be saved and a two-
thirds chance that no one would be saved. A clear majority of participants chose Programme 
A, suggesting that by avoiding the gamble the sample was risk averse. The participants were 
then asked to choose between two additional alternatives: Programme C, which allowed 400 
people to die, and Programme D, which entailed a one-third chance that nobody would die 
and a two thirds chance that 600 people would die. Interestingly, this time participants 
chose the latter option. Upon closer look, it becomes obvious that the two choice pairs are 
equivalent. Yet, the decision between Programme A and B is framed in terms of ‘lives saved’, 
while the decision between Programme C and D is framed in terms of ‘lives lost’ — in other 
words, gains and losses — which, due to loss aversion, significantly influenced how individu-
als judged the decision (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984, pp. 343–344).  
In the prior example the framing effect originated from the way in which the decision was 
worded, but other attributes can be altered to produce similar results. Both attribute sali-
ence and simplification impart additional information or cause mental associations that are 
picked up primarily by System 1 processes, in effect changing the preferences of the decision 
maker (Michalek et al., 2015, p. 9). For instance, an ever-growing body of psychological 
research has demonstrated that social norm salience can induce a significant framing effect 
(see for instance Cialdini, 2005; Cialdini, Reno & Kallgren, 1990; Costa & Kahn, 2013; 
Graffeo, Ritov, Bonini & Hadjichristidis, 2015). Social norms are different than personal 
norms or values because they evoke associations of belonging, conformity and societal sanc-
tions, and thus have a strong and stable influence on human behaviour (Kinzig et al., 2013, 
p. 165). Decisions can be framed using two distinct normative categories: descriptive (i.e. 
information on what is generally done) or injunctive (i.e. information on what society deems 
morally right or wrong) (Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein & Griskevicius, 2007, pp. 429–
430).7 Research has shown that framing effects are influenced by whichever social norm is 
more salient, a phenomenon called the focus theory of normative conduct (Cialdini et al., 
1990). In other words, descriptive and injunctive normative framings can produce independ-
ent effects on human judgement, even if presented simultaneously (Schultz et al., 2007). 
Default options, such as the renewable energy example mentioned above, change the format 
in which information is presented and thus can also be considered a form of framing. The 
                                            
 
7  We include the third category, comparative, in our typology in Section 3.3 to denote when 
a social norm is presented in such a way that makes a comparison of behaviour more 
salient. 
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status quo bias that pins individuals to a default option is fundamentally caused by a com-
bination of the anchoring heuristic and loss aversion, but defaults are also thought to func-
tion via cognitive inertia, which is a fundamental aversion to mental strain (i.e. a bias for 
cognitive ease) as well as implicit recommendation, which implies that one perceives default 
options as being superior or endorsed (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984, p. 348; Michalek et al., 
2015, p. 9).  
Additional biases often described in the literature include present bias, confirmation bias 
and the overthinking bias. Present bias concerns our propensity to discount gains and losses 
that we foresee in the future (European Commission, 2016, p. 8). Although discounting is a 
fundamental aspect of economic analysis, such as cost-benefit analysis or cost-effectiveness 
analysis, both the anchoring and availability heuristics help explain this bias for the present 
from the perspective of cognitive psychology. Moreover, present bias can also be thought of 
in terms of time-inconsistent or hyperbolic discounting, which refers to experimental evi-
dence that people disproportionately discount distant-future prospects compared to near-
future ones (Thaler, 2016, p. 91). Confirmation bias occurs due to associative memory and 
the availability heuristic (or that which comes to mind easiest), and can be described as the 
“deliberate search for confirming evidence” (Kahneman, 2012, p. 81). Confirmation bias 
may help explain instances of science denial; those who are sceptical of anthropogenic cli-
mate change (which enjoys a high level of scientific consensus), may be trapped by a System 
1 bias for confirmatory evidence found outside of scientific circles that vindicates their own 
pre-existing beliefs (Weber & Stern, 2011, p. 5). Finally, the overthinking bias is actually a 
System 2 bias that is caused by increased levels of so-called ‘cognitive noise’ or information 
and stimulant overload that leads to mental strain and subsequently indifference or prefer-
ence inconsistency when faced with a decision (Lee, Amir & Ariely, 2009, p. 173).  Moreover, 
after long-term cognitive strain, an individual may inadvertently revert to relying on System 
1 processes, thereby perpetuating all the aforementioned biases for tasks that require more 
deliberate thinking. 
Together the findings from cognitive psychology detailed above constitute the heuristics and 
biases approach to bounded rationality. With this rich body of research as an empirical basis, 
in the next section, we explain how nudging utilizes the heuristics and biases associated with 
System 1 cognition to change behaviour and the choices individuals make. 
2.1.4 Designing a nudge: Choice architecture 
Thaler and Sunstein (2008) aptly use the phrase choice architecture to signify the context in 
which a decision is made, implying that like any physical structure, the environment sur-
rounding a decision can be ‘designed’ by ‘choice architects’ (p. 3). Discussed at length 
above, framing alters the choice architecture, guiding the decision maker predictably in one 
direction or another. Consequently, nudging can be thought of as the intentional framing of 
a choice by a political or private actor. Indeed, most nudges in use today (e.g. defaults, 
social norms, feature salience and others) operate chiefly via framing effects in addition to 
a handful of other biases. Priming, however, is one example where this is not the case. 
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Priming nudges expose the individual to some stimulus before any choice is presented. The 
primed stimulus is held unconsciously in associative memory and influences subsequent de-
cisions and behaviour due to the availability heuristic (Momsen & Stoerk, 2014, p. 379). Not 
to be confused with subliminal messaging, which makes use of covert, rapidly presented 
images or text; the prime itself is not necessarily unbeknownst to the individual even though 
its effect occurs subconsciously. In Section 3.3 we describe the different types of nudges 
that exist in the environmental field and propose a typology that organizes these nudges 
based on their function. 
Recall the definition of a nudge proposed at the onset of this paper as any aspect of the 
decision context or choice architecture that will lead to a predictable change in behaviour 
without limiting the chooser’s options (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 6). It may now be clear 
to the reader that this definition is far too simple. A more exact definition would necessarily 
take both dual process theory and the heuristics and biases approach to bounded rationality 
into account. Thus, in Figure 1 we propose multiple revisions to Thaler and Sunstein’s fre-
quently cited original description and arrive upon a ‘technical definition’ of a nudge, which 
we then use throughout the remainder of this paper. 
Figure 1: A technical definition of nudge 
Nudges function first and foremost by either capturing and utilizing or blocking the biases 
that arise from System 1 thinking. We include the word ‘predetermined’, for the same reason 
Hausman and Welch (2010) refer to nudges as “ways of influencing choice”, in order to 
connote agency (p. 126). Thaler and Sunstein (2008) claim that nudges are not always inten-
tionally placed, and even go a step further arguing famously that there is no such thing as a 
‘neutral design’ for choice architecture — in other words, we are constantly being nudged 
whether there is intention behind the nudge or not (p. 11). However, in this paper we only 
consider nudges that are intentional, as assuming agency on behalf of the policymaker is a 
precondition for evaluating nudging as a policy instrument. A similar approach is taken by 
others (e.g. Lepenies & Małecka, 2015).  
The second part of our definition pertains to whether the nudge approach restricts choices. 
From our perspective (one grounded in a behavioural science understanding of nudging), 
upholding freedom of choice (i.e. libertarian paternalism) is not required for something to 
qualify as a nudge. This runs counter to how many authors define nudging (including Thaler 
and Sunstein), who arrive at their definition through a political, philosophical lens. That 
said, in the following we discuss nudging as a policy to induce ecologically friendly behav-
iour. As much of the literature on nudging as public policy centres on the political paradigm 
of libertarian paternalism, we consider it necessary to subsequently discuss this in brief. The 
A nudge is any part of the choice architecture that systematically capitalizes on System 1 
biases to guide decisions and/or behaviour in a predetermined and predictable way; it 
may but must not necessarily uphold freedom of choice. 
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concept of libertarian paternalism has implications especially for ethical treatments of nudg-
ing and in recent years has become a hotly debated topic among politicians, legal scholars, 
philosophers as well as behavioural scientists. 
2.2 Nudging and libertarian paternalism 
A policy or government is paternalistic if it limits individual liberties by banning, regulating 
or influencing behaviour or choices to achieve the governing authority’s own aims. Such a 
policy may also aim to increase social welfare more generally but does so by targeting the 
choices made by individual citizens. The notion of government promoting or prohibiting cer-
tain behaviours has been the topic of endless debate throughout history. Drawing from John 
Stuart Mill’s famous critique of paternalism in On Liberty (1863), in which he denounces 
“despotic, or what is called paternal, government”, ethical concerns regarding paternalism 
— including most current arguments — centre on the infringement of rights and freedoms (p. 
197). Mill sums up his condemnation of paternalistic society, claiming: “The sole end for 
which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of 
action of any of their number, is self-protection” (p. 23). Sunstein (2014) and others refer 
to this principle of the rights of government as Mill’s Harm Principle, and generally use it to 
frame discussions of potentially paternalistic policymaking (p. 5). Simply put, the normative 
argument follows that policymakers should refrain from intruding into the lives of citizens 
unless they seek to save some number of them from harm. 
Legislation that aims at changing behaviour in the absence of harm to others is paternalistic; 
however, the degree of paternalism can be viewed as existing on a spectrum (Sunstein, 2014, 
pp. 55–65). On one end, hard paternalism imposes high costs on individuals, material or 
otherwise. Hard paternalism examples include most regulatory policy interventions that in-
duce behavioural change by threatening certain sanctions. A sin tax on cigarettes, for in-
stance, could be considered a case of hard paternalism, as those affected must choose to 
either give up a portion of their income or cease the behaviour. Conversely, soft paternalism 
entails few or negligible costs for individuals. To stick with the example of financial costs, a 
minor five-cent charge for grocery bags is categorized more readily as soft paternalism. 
Under this framework, libertarian paternalism can be considered a special form of soft pa-
ternalism that does not involve any material costs (Sunstein, 2014, p. 57). Put differently, 
libertarian paternalists argue that a policy intervention can be designed in such a way that 
guides behaviour while upholding an individual’s freedom of choice, in effect circumnavi-
gating the most common objections to paternalistic policymaking. Thaler and Sunstein 
(2003) claim that even though “libertarians embrace freedom of choice [...] and paternalists 
are thought to be deeply sceptical of freedom of choice”, libertarian paternalism should be 
viewed positively as a promising way to bridge gaps between polarized political ideologies 
(p. 16).  
Proponents of nudging (most notably Thaler and Sunstein) consider the nudge approach as 
inherently libertarian, and use this to justify nudging as an acceptable flavour of soft pater-
nalism. Moreover, Sunstein (2014) argues that due to the prevalence of ‘behavioural market 
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failures’ (i.e. the heuristics and biases outlined above), the notion that individuals know 
what is in their best interest can be contested (p. 7). As a consequence, there is a clear 
moral argument, akin to Mill’s Harm Principle, for using libertarian paternalistic interven-
tions such as ‘pro-social’ nudges to steer people away from decisions that harm society and 
‘pro-self’ nudges, which aim at protecting the individual from bad decisions (Barton & Grüne-
Yanoff, 2015, p. 344). Nonetheless, in a separate book entitled Why Nudge?, Sunstein con-
cedes that not all costs related to policy intervention are material or financial and that 
nudging may require a temporary decrease in well-being or impose unavoidable psychologi-
cal costs, such as disgust towards the packaging of cigarettes, which in some countries con-
tains graphic or disturbing imagery.  
Paternalistic interventions can be further categorized as ends-based or means-based (Sun-
stein, 2014, p. 63). Means paternalism responds to and targets people’s own ends, giving 
them the autonomy to choose whatever these may be. Therefore, means-based nudging at-
tempts to guide an individual towards behaviour that is in their own interest, “as judged by 
themselves” (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 5). On the other hand, ends paternalism steers 
people towards set ends regardless of whether these are wanted or not. Most pro-social 
nudges, fall in this category because the specific end of the nudge may or may not align with 
the personal ends of the individual being nudged. The renewable energy default nudge, for 
example, is arguably good for society — the uptake of solar and wind technologies reduces 
the burning of fossil fuels, which release climate change-causing greenhouse gasses (GHG) 
and other harmful pollutants. Yet, not every person sees clean energy use as a personal end. 
Thus, Thaler and Sunstein’s concept of libertarian paternalism as chiefly means-based may 
be too narrow because the degree to which individuals can and do decide their own ends 
under a nudge-based regime is questionable. 
Some claim that nudging and libertarian paternalism are often conflated and accordingly 
that libertarian paternalism alone is an unsatisfactory justification for policy-induced nudges 
(see for instance Gigerenzer, 2015). Hausman and Welch (2010) contend that many of the 
examples called nudges and thus by extension labelled as libertarian paternalism are not 
paternalistic at all. For example, information campaigns that shed light on the harms of 
smoking or use descriptive social norms to reduce binge drinking behaviour on college cam-
puses are not paternalistic, as their primary aim is to protect a population from harm, while 
concurrently respecting rights and treating individuals as autonomous decision makers (Haus-
man & Welch, 2010, p. 127).8 In brief, there seem to be two camps in the literature: those 
                                            
 
8  As per the definition of nudge in Figure 1, the anti-smoking campaign alone does not 
qualify as a nudge because it appeals primarily to System 2, reflective processes. Never-
theless, many authors describe pure information provision as nudging, which we consider 
to be a major cause for confusion and inconsistency within the literature. Certainly, de-
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who claim that all nudges are a form of libertarian paternalism and defensible as such (e.g. 
Thaler & Sunstein, 2008) and those who argue that nudges are conceptually separate and 
only in some cases follow the tenets of libertarian paternalism (e.g. the current authors; 
Hansen, 2016; Hansen & Jespersen, 2013; Hausman & Welch, 2010). The remainder of this 
document concerns an evaluation of nudging as an environmental policy tool and does not 
investigate libertarian paternalism as such. However, particularly in our assessment of the 
ethics of nudging, the discussion returns to issues related to autonomy and human dignity. 
It is therefore necessary to keep the political philosophy of libertarian paternalism in mind. 
2.3 Criticism 
In the decade since its introduction, nudge theory has attracted a great deal of criticism 
regarding its effectiveness, ethical grounding and broader role in public policy. From a prac-
tical standpoint, some question the real-life usefulness of a policy informed by bounded 
rationality. For one, Gigerenzer (2015) claims that nudging puts too much emphasis on the 
‘individual mind’, in effect “closing our eyes to institutions that steer behaviour so that they 
can take advantage of it” (p. 363). In other words, nudging does not adequately take eco-
logical rationality into account and is instead founded on ‘narrow logical norms’ of human 
rationality (Gigerenzer, 2015, p. 365). In a sense, the author’s argument boils down to the 
idea that nudging underestimates human capacity to make informed decisions and adapt 
behaviour. This argument is echoed by Lepenies and Małecka (2015), who suggest that a 
‘non-cognitive’, nudge-based policy undermines individuals’ ability to ‘self-legislate’, i.e., 
learn, adapt and change behaviour wilfully (p. 435). By way of a metaphor, many academics 
view nudging as a form of government induced autopilot. Similar to how a pilot can use 
autopilot to guide his or her aircraft, thereby avoiding mistakes that could lead to disastrous 
results, governments can rely on System 1 biases to steer citizens in one way or another. 
However, neither the pilot nor the citizen learns anything from this setup and once autopilot 
is removed both must return to their biased and faulty decision-making facilities. This relates 
to a further common criticism, namely that there is little evidence to suggest that the be-
havioural change caused by a nudge is long-lasting (Raihani, 2013, p. 2). Especially, nudges 
that work solely at System 1 levels of cognition, impacting only automatic, habitual pro-
cesses, may lose their effectiveness over time (Michalek et al., 2015, p. 14). Furthermore, 
studies show that social norm nudges are mediated by political ideology, suggesting that 
individual difference variables such as inter alia culture and political persuasion limit the 
scalability of some nudges (Costa & Kahn, 2013). 
                                            
 
pending on how the campaigns are designed and implemented, nudges could be incorpo-
rated by, e.g., framing the information in a particular way or evoking social norms (such 
as in the binge drinking example).  
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From an ethical standpoint most detractors paint nudging as a ‘manipulation of choice’ 
(Bovens, 2009, p. 208). Common arguments against nudging claim that it is ‘non-transpar-
ent’, operates ‘in the dark’ and infringes upon the personal autonomy by acting on behalf 
of individuals without their explicit permission (Bovens, 2009, p. 4; Hansen & Jespersen, 
2013, p. 15; see also Schubert, 2015, 2016; Sunstein, 2015). The so-called welfarist argu-
ment sums up these and other moral arguments against nudging, suggesting that due to the 
inevitable infringement of human autonomy and dignity, subjective well-being is in turn 
affected (Sunstein, 2015, p. 414). In other words, robbing individuals of their agency in a 
way that is non-avoidable and not transparent will lead to a decrease in welfare because 
autonomy is a right. Furthermore, Hansen and Jespersen (2013) and others bring up the 
crucial matter of accountability on the part of the one doing the nudging, i.e., the govern-
ment. If used malevolently by a repressive or dictatorial regime, then nudging is clearly on 
weak ethical grounds (Hansen & Jespersen, 2013, p. 4). Finally, Lepenies and Małecka (2015) 
advocate for restraint in the use of nudging, highlighting the legal and institutional ramifi-
cations of injecting nudging into policy. The authors’ central thesis contends that nudges 
are ‘non-normative’ policy instruments, which influence behaviour without using legal 
norms. Furthermore, because nudges are invisible to the public they are ‘diachronic’ in na-
ture, meaning that they may automatically persist whenever the government changes hands 
among political parties and in the worst case may simply be forgotten by public officials 
(Lepenies & Małecka, 2015, p. 435). 
Above we detail some of the many open questions concerning the use of nudging as public 
policy. Due to the complexity of the field and fierce debate surrounding it, incorporating 
nudge theory into policymaking is no straightforward task (Moseley & Stoker, 2013). Yet, as 
we will see, particularly in the realm of environmental policy, there may be a role for nudg-
ing, if implemented in such a way that respects the overall ethical and practical limitations 
of the tool. In the next section, we turn specifically to ecological or green nudging and 
discuss the ways in which nudge theory can and has been used to pursue environmental ends. 
3 Nudging for the environment 
So far we have outlined the origins and functionality of nudging more broadly. In the follow-
ing, we focus in particular on nudging in the environmental field, what we call green nudg-
ing. First, this section will outline the nature and complexity of environmental problems. 
Next, we will discuss the policy instruments that have been used thus far to tackle environ-
mental problems and how successful they have been. Afterwards, nudging will be introduced 
as a possible addition to the environmental policy toolkit, better suited to address the 
bounded rationality of human nature than the conventional instruments. Additionally, the 
characteristics and appropriateness of nudges in the environmental field will be laid forth. 
In the subsequent section, a typology of green nudges is presented to allow for a more nu-
anced view of nudging as an instrument with different dispositions and effects. Lastly, 
against this background we pose the guiding question of this paper, namely whether nudges 
should be used as a means to pursue environmental ends. 
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3.1 The nature of environmental problems 
By virtue of the focus of this study, we only address problems which emerge from “environ-
mentally significant” human behaviour and not natural disasters or chance occurrences 
(Stern, 2011, p. 305). Many of the negative impacts of human consumption and activity on 
the environment have certain characteristics that distinguish them from other policy areas 
and make them especially difficult with respect to traditional policy instruments. Such fea-
tures are, for example, that they are usually complex, concern long time horizons and in-
volve consequences and causes that are often unequally distributed (Mickwitz, 2003, p. 417). 
Furthermore, the environmental protection is a public good, for example, clean air, fresh 
drinking water, arable soil etc. For this reason, socio-political factors such as social 
(in)equality, economic and political participation rights as well as social inclusion are highly 
relevant regarding the provision of environmental goods (Croson & Treich, 2014, p. 336).  
3.1.1 The tragedy of the commons 
The lack of noticeable cause-consequence relations in terms of the treatment of environ-
mental goods as well as their public character often lead to environmental devastation. The 
concept of the tragedy of the commons, most famously posited by Garret Hardin in the 
1960s, explains this phenomenon. The theory basically states that individuals put their own 
self-interest over the interest of the community when it comes to the usage of public re-
sources (Hardin, 1968). This happens primarily because commons resources are not anyone’s 
private property. Consequently, no one feels personally responsible for the good/resource 
and no one can be excluded from consumption (e.g. breathing fresh air). Moreover, the 
negative impacts of private actions may not have a direct or immediate effect on the pol-
luter and are instead diffused in society (Ostrom, 1990). The fact that a single individual can 
benefit from common goods and natural resources without the risk of being excluded from 
their use if he or she does not contribute to its sustenance, opens the door to ‘free-riding’. 
The fundamental problem with most natural resources is that the incentive for the individual 
to ensure that the public good is preserved is simply not large enough (Grossman & Hart, 
1980, p. 42). Additionally, this refusal to contribute usually remains unnoticed by the rest 
of the population, since each person’s share is not large enough to make a direct, visible 
difference in outcome and thus cannot be traced back to the responsible polluter or con-
sumer (Grossman & Hart, 1980). 
One good example of both a tragedy of the commons and the free-riding dilemma is human-
induced climate change (Dietz, Ostrom & Stern, 2003, p. 1907). In this case, the negative 
consequences of climate change caused in part by individual or company behaviour (e.g. 
flying on a regular basis or producing energy-intensive products) do not directly impact the 
polluter. Generally, the consequences become noticeable in other parts of the world where 
the conditions are already fragile (e.g. small island countries) or where people are in more 
vulnerable climatic positions (e.g. those living under conditions of drought in Africa). Fur-
thermore, these consequences may only become apparent in the distant future (e.g. the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) predicts that by 2050 200 million refugees 
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will be forced to leave their country due to climate change and need support from developed 
nations) (Brown, 2007, p. 2). Possible consequences of climate change induced mass migra-
tion include the depletion of public resources and conflict (Dietz et al., 2003).  
Interestingly, the original game theoretical formulation of the tragedy of the commons as-
sumes purely rational, self-interested agents and does not take behavioural considerations 
into account. However, extensive experimental research conducted by Elinor Ostrom and 
her colleagues has underlined the limits of this homo economicus approach to conceptualis-
ing social dilemmas. She argues persuasively that a rational choice approach to commons 
and social dilemmas views the individuals involved as “prisoners” unable to escape the tragic 
conflict between private and social interest (Ostrom, 1990, p. 7). However, laboratory and 
field research suggests that in reality a myriad of behavioural factors, including the powerful 
influence of social norms, work to both facilitate and hinder collective action (Ostrom, 1998, 
2003a).  
3.1.2 Barriers to ecological behaviour 
As we have seen, the nature of environmental problems makes them especially difficult to 
solve. Apart from the general problems related to common resources mentioned above, 
other psychological, financial and material obstacles stand in the way of adopting ecological 
behaviour (Centre d’analyse strategique, 2011, p. 1). 
Looking at households, consumption at this level is accountable for a relatively large share 
of global GHG emissions — either directly through the use of products and services or indi-
rectly through domestic as well as foreign supply chains (Michalek et al., 2015, p. 1). Thus, 
fostering environmental friendly behaviour at the household level can contribute considera-
bly to reduced GHG emissions and potentially mitigate climate change (Michalek et al., 
2015). However, to do so, individuals must be addressed directly and their daily habits al-
tered. This is where psychological factors such as bounded rationality become apparent, 
which can be difficult to address with public policies. 
There are five elements specific to environmental issues that, due to human psychology and 
bounded rationality, hinder ecological behaviour. These include passive choice, complexity, 
limited personal experience, third-party marketing and inter-temporal choice (Beshears, 
Choi, Laibson & Madrian, 2008, pp. 1788-1790). In addition, environmental issues are often 
associated with strong moral feelings such as guilt, shame, pride, etc. These feelings affect 
people’s beliefs and attitudes towards environmental programmes and policies (Croson & 
Treich, 2014, p. 336). Therefore, when policymakers try to push people too hard into a 
certain type of desired behaviour, these efforts tend to fail due to psychological barriers. 
One other reason for this is that when it comes to environmental policies, the factors of 
complexity, long time frames and vague cause-consequence relations result in political 
measures in which the direct negative outcomes for the individuals (e.g. restrictions or pay-
ments) are much more noticeable than the positive outcomes that will materialize for soci-
ety in the long run. Since payoffs or damages do not always become immediately apparent, 
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there is no perceived need for fierce action — e.g., in the case of climate change, the ben-
efits of mitigation via emission reductions are spread temporally but the costs are borne in 
the present (Centre d’analyse strategique, 2011, p. 3). 
There are also material factors that reinforce the barriers to ecological behaviour. Many 
environmental friendly habits can only take place if the necessary infrastructure is provided 
(e.g. recycling system, public transportation system, etc.). Furthermore, these services must 
be accessible for everyone. The less developed such structures are, the less likely they will 
be used (Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002, p. 248). 
Finally, the so-called attitude-behaviour gap plays an important role when motivations for 
or against ecological behaviour are being discussed.9 The concept describes an observed 
discrepancy between knowing about or being willing to change environmentally harmful be-
haviour and acting to do so. Ecological attitudes tend not to be reflected by corresponding 
forms of behaviour if active changes in daily routines and habits are required (Centre d’an-
alyse strategique, 2011, p. 2). Even if knowledge is acquired, it does not necessarily cause 
the individual to abandon the environmentally destructive habits (Centre d’analyse strate-
gique, 2011, p. 2). Psychologists as well as social and political scientists have tried to find 
ways to close the attitude-behaviour gap with a range of different soft policy tools such as 
information and market-based incentives (Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002). 
Until recently, most theories in environmental economics based their argumentation on a 
neoclassical model, assuming humans to be rational actors or homo economicus. Conse-
quently, conventional recommendations focus on policy instruments that rely on sanctions, 
incentives or the provision of information (Schubert, 2016, p. 2). As described in the previous 
section, there has been a shift in recent years towards a more realistic picture of human 
economic behaviour. This shift has led to the incorporation of behavioural insights in the 
field of environmental policy. Among such strategies, green nudges may become a popular 
means of addressing environmental problems. The aim of a green nudge is to use “behav-
ioural biases such as compliance to social norms or inertia to change in order to encourage 
citizens to adopt lifestyles showing a greater respect for the environment” (Centre d’analyse 
strategique, 2011, p. 1). In the next section, we introduce ways in which green nudges can 
complement the traditional environmental toolkit and outline what sets them apart. 
3.2 Nudging as an addition to the traditional policy toolkit 
Green nudges expand the range of policy instruments used to tackle pressing environmental 
concerns. Below we outline the commonly used or conventional environmental policy instru-
ments. Thereupon an attempt will be made to incorporate green nudging into this scheme 
as a potential addition to the traditional policy toolkit. In this process, the characteristics 
                                            
 
9  The attitude-behaviour gap is also commonly referred to as the intention-action gap (e.g. 
Allcott & Mullainathan, 2010; Momsen & Stoerk, 2014). 
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of nudging as a new non-regulatory, soft policy tool will be examined, different types will 
be presented in detail and the adequacy of green nudges will be questioned. 
3.2.1 Traditional environmental policy instruments 
Environmental policy instruments as defined by Mickwitz (2003) are “the set of techniques 
by which governmental authorities wield their power in attempting to affect society — in 
terms of values and beliefs, action and organization — in such a way as to improve, or to 
prevent the deterioration of, the quality of the natural environment” (p. 419; see also 
Lundqvist, 1996, p. 16; Vedung, 1998, p. 21).  
Table 1: Traditional environmental policy toolkit 
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 HARD <<<                                                                                                                        >>> SOFT 
Source: adapted from Table 1 in UK Science and Technology Committee (2011) and Figure 11.1 in Vedung 
(1998) 
Each policy instrument is usually chosen, designed and implemented with a specific problem 
in mind (in this case an environmental concern), at a particular time and in the context of 
the current political-ideological situation of the government (Borrás & Edquist, 2013, p. 3). 
Nevertheless, the resulting uniqueness of each policy instrument does not impede a classifi-
cation according to the general logic behind the political action (Borrás & Edquist, 2013, p. 
3). 
There are many different ways to classify policy instruments (e.g. Linder & Peters, 1998; UK 
Science and Technology Committee, 2011, p. 10). However, for environmental policies in 
particular, three main types of instruments can be distinguished: regulatory, economic and 
information (Mickwitz, 2003, p. 419; Vedung, 1998, p. 250). These instruments can be cat-
egorized in accordance with various criteria. One way is to arrange them based on the degree 
of the authoritative force involved (Mickwitz, 2003, p. 419). Table 1 shows the three types 
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of policy instruments, organised by their degree of restrictiveness from left (hard) to right 
(soft). 
Regulatory instruments 
Regulations (also known as command-and-control measures) can be defined as “measures 
undertaken by the governmental units to influence people by means of verbally formulated 
rules and directives which mandate receivers to act in accordance with what is ordered in 
these rules and directives” (Vedung, 1998, p. 51). In environmental policies, regulatory (re-
strictive) instruments can be subdivided into mandatory regulations and standards (Michalek 
et al., 2015, p. 10). Environmental regulations have been commonly used to intervene and 
eliminate environmentally damaging behaviour in most industrialised countries (Mickwitz, 
2003, p. 419). Prominent examples of mandatory environmental regulation include legisla-
tive bans on activities that are harmful for the environment, such as an upper limit on emis-
sion levels for power stations burning coal in the US Clean Power Plan (CPP). In the case of 
other command-and-control measures, standards are introduced, e.g., prohibiting cars lack-
ing a green emission sticker to enter the city centre. 
Economic instruments 
Economic instruments are tools based on the logic of the market and thus aim to create or 
alter benefits and/or costs for the agents involved (Mickwitz, 2003, p. 419). This economic 
category “encompasses tools that guide individual behaviour in a direction deemed benefi-
cial by the regulator (e.g. environmental protection and/or sustainability) but does not for-
mally restrict an individual’s freedom of choice” (Michalek et al., 2015, p. 10). Market-based 
instruments function by either handing out or taking away material resources. This can be 
done in-kind (non-fiscal) or in cash (fiscal) (Vedung, 1998, p. 51). The most prominent ex-
amples of market-based environmental policy instruments are the European Emissions Trad-
ing System (EU ETS) or the deposit system for cans and bottles that exists in some European 
countries such as Germany. A softer, non-fiscal tool that uses non-financial incentives is, for 
example, awarding certificates to best-practice companies that create the least amount of 
annual waste in comparison to their competition. 
Information instruments 
Information as a policy instrument “covers attempts at influencing people through the trans-
fer of knowledge, the communication of reasoned argument, and persuasion. No more than 
the plain transfer of knowledge or persuasive reasoning is offered to influence people to do 
what the government deems desirable” (Vedung, 1998, p. 51). This can be done through 
moral suasion, exhortation or public communication. Information can be provided in an af-
firmative way, for example, by designating one week a year when everyone is encouraged 
to travel by bike instead of by car. Through this initiative, people learn from experience 
that more sustainable and less stressful alternatives to driving or the public transportation 
system exist. On the other hand, information campaigns can also foster more ecologically 
conscious behaviour by presenting negative information, for instance, warning people in a 
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public campaign about the impact that deforestation has on the planet to promote the re-
duction of paper waste. 
In the last years, the use of soft instruments has been steadily increasing in many countries 
(particularly visible in Europe and the US). This development towards more integrative gov-
ernance is at the core of a fundamental transformation that sees the role of government 
changing from that of provider and regulator to coordinator and facilitator (Borrás & Edquist, 
2013, p. 4). In the course of this transformation, soft instruments have become an important 
part of the policy mix (Borrás & Edquist, 2013, p. 4). Green nudging falls into this category. 
One characteristic common to the three conventional policy instrument types presented 
above is that they make the primary assumption that every individual reflects and considers 
all options available and finally makes a utility-maximising decision in line with stable pref-
erences (Michalek et al., 2015, p. 11). This is partly because nearly all economic policy 
analyses use the traditional, neoclassical economic paradigm, assuming rational actors. In 
terms of the dual process theory of cognition described above and in Kahneman (2012), the 
traditional instruments rely on the reflective and self-aware decision making of System 2 to 
work as intended. Since the introduction of bounded rationality, it is clear why, so far, some 
of these policy tools have turned out to be virtually ineffective in solving environmental 
issues. This has as much to do with the nature of environmental issues as with the fact that 
decisions taken by individuals are determined by a multitude of factors in addition to prices, 
product information or bans on environmentally harmful goods and practices (Michalek et 
al., 2015, p. 2). As described above, research in behavioural economics has shown that heu-
ristics and their related cognitive biases have a large influence on the decision-making pro-
cess in terms of environmental issues — and that this occurs without any reflection on the 
part of the individual (Reisch & Hagen, 2011, p. 222). 
3.2.2 Nudging in an environmental context 
In Section 2, we introduced dual process theory, which claims a distinction between two 
different but interacting cognitive processes — one automatic, intuitive and driven by emo-
tions (System 1), the other analytical, conscious and deliberately controlled (System 2). As 
per our technical definition of nudging in Figure 1, the mechanisms of a nudge function 
within the unconscious mode of System 1. Conversely, the traditional policy instruments 
used to foster environmentally friendly behaviour assume that humans rely principally on 
System 2 processes. This unique attribute of green nudging simultaneously sets it apart from 
and makes it a potentially key addition to the typical policy toolkit (Schubert, 2016, p. 3). 
Here we introduce green nudging as a soft, non-regulatory extension of the environmental 
policy toolkit. In contrast to the commonly used instruments, presented above, nudging ap-
proaches human decision making in a completely different way. It relies on a more nuanced 
picture of human behaviour found in the behavioural sciences such as cognitive and social 
psychology and sociology. Research in these fields has identified a series of interventions 
that can be made to influence behaviour by changing decision context (Mont, Lehner, 
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Heiskanen, Sverige & Naturvårdsverket, 2014, p. 22). Nudging extends the ‘soft end’ of the 
toolkit, introducing an additional non-regulatory, potentially non-intrusive way of pursuing 
environmental ends. While nudge-based interventions belong under the category of non-
regulatory instruments, they are not synonymous with all non-regulatory policy instruments. 
For instance, openly persuasive interventions and the straightforward provision of infor-
mation do not count as nudges since the underlying idea of nudging is to prompt choices 
primarily without necessarily triggering a conscious consideration of the options available 
(UK Science and Technology Committee, 2011, p. 12). 
Therefore, there are two fundamental differences that distinguish nudges from conventional 
instruments: (1) they do not assume the prevailing economic paradigm of rational choice 
and (2) they influence behaviour via System 1 processes — as per our technical definition. 
Neoclassical economic thinking, which is at the core of all conventional economic consider-
ations, cannot be as easily applied to nudging. Meanwhile regulatory, economic and infor-
mation policies are designed with the assumption of completely rational human beings who 
make all their decisions within a System 2 thinking mode. Nudging explicitly addresses au-
tomatic and intuitive thinking, which steers many of the decision-making processes in daily 
life. Thus, nudging goes beyond other soft policy instruments — such as information provi-
sion, which require deliberate thinking — into the sphere of automatic and intuitive decision 
making (Michalek et al., 2015, p. 11). 
Unlike other conventional policy instruments, nudging influences individuals by either block-
ing or triggering the cognitive biases we all have and thus would not be effective on a totally 
rational actor (Schubert, 2016, p. 3). They can only function in a bounded rationality world, 
where individuals have limited cognitive capacity, attention and willpower and where pref-
erences are ‘constructed’ instead of ‘given’ (Schubert, 2016, p. 3). However, this does not 
mean that System 2 processes are not affected by nudges. In Section 2, we point out how 
the two systems constantly interact with each other. For the analysis of nudging as a policy 
instrument this means that nudging first triggers an intuitive process, blocking or exploiting 
a cognitive bias. Subsequently, this process can (but must not always) affect a conscious, 
analytical assessment of the decision at hand (Hansen & Jespersen, 2013, p. 15).  
Especially for environmental ends, nudging can be a very effective tool (Dolan, Hallsworth, 
Halpern, King & Vlaev, 2010). This is in part due to the nature of environmental problems. 
As discussed in Section 3.1, environmental problems are usually quite complex, span over 
long periods of time and their consequences and causes are often unequally distributed. 
Moreover, free-riding and the deprivation of public natural goods are often key challenges. 
The acknowledgement and integration of behavioural insights into the process of environ-
mental policymaking marks a significant step towards a more effective regulation of envi-
ronmentally harmful behaviour (Momsen & Stoerk, 2014, p. 376). 
However, one aspect that must be considered when comparing and weighing the different 
policy instruments against each other is that several tools can also be used in concert. In 
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some cases, a good mix of different policy tools can help to address one issue more effec-
tively that any one used in isolation (Schubert, 2016, p. 3). The UK Science and Technology 
Committee (2011) states as one of its central findings that “non-regulatory measures used 
in isolation, including nudges, are less likely to be effective. Effective policies often use a 
range of interventions” (p. 5). Although this might be a useful approach in practice, the 
analysis of the different policy instruments on a stand-alone basis is necessary to find out 
about the different characteristics and outcomes that each type of policy intervention has 
on its own. Only thereafter can research focus on potential mergers of several instruments 
to achieve a single goal. While this is not the object of the current study, it should be kept 
in mind when evaluating policy instruments in general. 
Having covered the differences between nudging and conventional policy instruments, we 
turn now to a more detailed discussion of the various forms of green nudging. Not all green 
nudges function in the same way. The following section will shed light on the different types 
of green nudges, detailing their different characteristics as well as what implications these 
might have for an evaluation. 
3.3 Towards a typology of green nudges 
There is a growing body of literature on existing or proposed green nudges. First, we over-
view how past authors have categorised nudges before presenting a typology that comple-
ments our technical definition. 
3.3.1 Categorising green nudges 
Even a cursory review of the research on nudging will reveal that there is a multitude of 
ways that one could classify nudges. Most systems are grounded in a fundamental dichotomy 
between nudges that target solely the automatic processes of System 1 and those that help 
engage the reflective nature of System 2. For one, Hansen and Jespersen (2013) refer to 
these as Type 1 and Type 2 respectively, arguing that only nudges aimed at influencing 
System 2 processes can be called a manipulation of choice as System 1 only controls habitual 
behaviour. However, others have chosen to use a different nomenclature, such as ‘mindless’ 
versus ‘mindful’ (e.g. House & Lyons, 2013) or ‘heuristic-triggering’ versus ‘heuristic-block-
ing’ (e.g. Barton & Grüne-Yanoff, 2015). As we explain in Section 2, nudges function primar-
ily via biases or systematic errors that arise due to cognitive heuristics — in other words, 
most of the time nudges do not trigger or block heuristics but rather biases. Hence, we find 
the ‘de-bias/re-bias’ dichotomy described in Amir and Lobel (2008) to be a more exact ter-
minology. In the majority of cases, System 1 nudges influence behaviour by ‘re-biasing’ an 
individual, i.e., exploiting biases such as the propensity to stick with the status quo. Con-
versely, System 2 nudges generally ‘de-bias’ the individual, thereby facilitating active think-
ing.  
Nudges can also be categorised using other metrics such as level of transparency or intended 
aim or target group. As for the former, Hansen and Jespersen (2013) distinguish between 
‘transparent’ and ‘non-transparent’ nudges, stating that the difference resides in the degree 
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to which those being nudged can “reconstruct either the intention or means by which be-
havioural change is pursued” (p. 18). The authors combine this measure with their Type 
1/Type 2 dichotomy to arrive upon a two-axis matrix for classifying nudges (see figure in 
Hansen and Jespersen, 2013, p. 20). House and Lyons (2013) further propose a method of 
categorisation based on whether the nudge promotes an individual’s own ends (e.g. quitting 
smoking, eating healthier), which they term ‘self-control boosting’, or whether it ‘activates 
behavioural standards,’ to which the individual is more likely indifferent (e.g. organ dona-
tion) (p. 7). This is somewhat alike the aforementioned ‘pro-self’ and ‘pro-social’ nudge 
categories (Hausman & Welch, 2010). 
Nudges have also been grouped depending on how they alter subjective perceptions of util-
ity. Within this framework, Fischer and Lotz (2014) describe four nudge types: (1) nudges 
that cause a reduction in perceived present (psychological or social) utility in favour of fu-
ture utility thereby blocking the present bias (‘discomfort nudges’), (2) nudges that increase 
or decrease expected utility by influencing the subjective evaluation of probability (‘proba-
bility nudges’), (3) nudges that exploit indifference or holes in an individual’s utility function 
(‘indifference nudges’) and (4) nudges that influence behaviour not guided by utility evalu-
ations, i.e., habits (‘automatism nudges’) (pp. 10-11). The authors admit that many nudges 
fall into two or more of the above categories as the underlying mechanism is commonly a 
mix of multiple different biases. 
Finally, nudges can also be classified based on who is doing the nudging. Public nudges are 
mandated by a state or local government and directed at citizens while private nudges are 
employed in the private sector either by enterprising employers attempting to alter their 
employees’ behaviour while in the workplace or by companies maximising profit.  
3.3.2 Proposed typology 
Figure 2 depicts a proposed typology of green nudges developed for the purposes of this 
paper. The typology represents an amalgamation of many of the previously mentioned ap-
proaches to categorising nudges but leans heavily on the Type 1/Type 2 model used in Han-
sen and Jespersen (2013).  
The typology uses a three-tiered hierarchical taxonomy system of increasing specificity. At 
the first level, passive nudges influence automatic, habitual behaviour and do not require 
any additional mental effort by the individual to work as intended. Conversely, activating 
nudges also make use of System 1 processes (e.g. social norms and framing) but steer the 
individual towards weighing and evaluating alternatives before making a more deliberate 
decision. Next, nudge types are grouped based on the underlying psychological mechanism. 
Finally, on the third tier, specific nudges are described using applied real-life examples. 
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Figure 2: Typology of green nudges 
 
Green Defaults 
Opt-in/out defaults refer to nudges that exploit the status quo bias by setting the desired 
ecological behaviour or environmentally friendly choice as the default. Above, we describe 
the example of preselecting the renewable energy option on home electricity contracts, but 
this nudge has also been used in consumer trials for home smart grids (Momsen & Stoerk, 
2014; Ölander & Thøgersen, 2014) and attaching carbon offsets to travel purchases (Araña 
& León, 2013). Physical defaults involve changes to physical attributes of the choice archi-
tecture, which then set a new default by imposing boundaries or limits on available options 
without fully erasing them. A common example here is the reduction of plate size to combat 
food waste in cafeterias (for empirical examples refer to Kallbekken & Sælen, 2013; Wan-
sink, 2004). Students can in theory return for seconds but tend to consume and waste signif-
icantly less food. 
Green Design 
Feature position refers to alterations in the way a choice architecture is arranged such that 
the ecological options are more noticeable (e.g. placing locally grown groceries at eye level 
in the aisle). Similarly, feature salience aims to make ecological choices more noticeable 
but does so instead by emphasising specific aspects of the choice architecture; e.g., the 
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‘Ambient Orb’ product provides buyers with a real-time feedback on their energy use, turn-
ing red at high levels of consumption (Michalek et al., 2015, p. 5). Visual illusions make use 
of common visual perception tricks to induce, e.g., slower driving. 
Ecological Priming 
In ecological priming, individuals are primed with an informational message or visual stimuli 
relating to environmental protection or common environmental themes. The primed stimulus 
remains in associative memory and influences behaviour in a predictable manner over a 
certain period of time. For instance, in a laboratory setting individuals primed with a pro-
environmental message were significantly more willing to buy package-free produce (Tate, 
Stewart & Daly, 2014, p. 230). Another commonly cited example includes environmental 
messages posted to restroom stall doors or above urinals, which aim to decrease paper towel 
usage after hand washing. Priming functions at a subconscious level but is not to be confused 
with subliminal messaging, which uses hidden stimuli that are not visible or noticeable to 
alter an individual’s choices. A priming cue may affect sub-conscious processes but is a con-
spicuous element of the choice environment (Dolan et al., 2010). 
Eco-labelling 
Eco-labelling refers to point of purchase messages such as product efficiency information or 
organic markers. A prime example of salience eco-labelling is the European Union (EU) en-
ergy efficiency labelling scheme for common household electrical appliances first introduced 
in 1995 (European Commission, 2012). The label is more than simply information provision 
because it affects the consumer at the point of purchase and thus counts as an element of 
the choice architecture. Moreover, the design of the label — its traffic light colour scheme 
and seven class hierarchy — has an impact on choice due to framing effects as well as the 
anchoring heuristic (Ölander & Thøgersen, 2014). Eco-labelling can also be framed in terms 
of gains and losses, e.g., the amount of money saved by switching to a more efficient appli-
ance. Gain/loss eco-labelling encourages more energy efficiency and sustainable consump-
tion due to loss aversion and naturally framing effects. If presented in terms of lifetime costs 
or savings, energy efficiency labelling can help overcome present bias and hyperbolic dis-
counting (Kallbekken, Sælen, & Hermansen, 2013). Eco-labelling also functions via implicit 
social norm framing. That is, the ubiquity of appliance efficiency tags or fuel rating stickers 
on cars speaks to the green social norms that exist in a society. Thus, eco-labelling may 
function not only through salience and framing effects but also by appealing to a buyer’s 
self-image and desire to belong to an ecologically-conscious society (Schubert, 2016). 
Green Social Norms 
There are three kinds of social norm nudges: descriptive, comparative and injunctive 
(Cialdini et al., 1990). Descriptive social norms provide information on what is generally 
done, i.e., information describing the behavioural norm. For instance, Schultz et al. (2007) 
provided 290 households with feedback on the average monthly electricity consumption in 
their immediate neighbourhood. This information was displayed directly alongside the usage 
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of each individual household. Over the span of one bill cycle (a month), the comparative 
social norm induced an average reduction in electricity consumption of 1.22 kWh daily for 
those households above the neighbourhood average. Intriguingly, those below the neighbour-
hood average tended to increase their electricity consumption. This boomerang effect in 
energy usage was diminished when the researchers added an emoticon to the electricity bill. 
If usage stayed below average residents received a smiley face; residents above average 
received an angry face. The emoticons evoke an injunctive norm, i.e., that what is morally 
correct or right in society. Similar studies have shown that employing green social norms can 
decrease littering (Cialdini, 1990), prompt hotel guests to reuse their towels (Cialdini, 2005) 
and encourage national park visitors to refrain from taking home souvenirs they find on the 
trail (Cialdini et al., 2006). All social norm nudges employ herding effects or the natural 
propensity among humans to cave to societal pressure: “If everybody is doing it then it must 
be the sensible thing to do” (Cialdini et al., 1990, p. 1015). An injunctive norm further 
appeals to a perceived risk of societal sanctioning as well as reciprocal altruism (Ostrom, 
2003). 
Interestingly, the effectiveness of green social norms is mediated by a variety of different 
variables. For example, Costa and Kahn (2013) provide evidence to suggest that a conserva-
tive political ideology will decrease the influence of energy conservation social norms. In a 
laboratory experiment Graffeo et al. (2015) found that social distance, i.e., whether or not 
the norm described nearby neighbours or members of a broader population, has a negative 
effect on the nudge’s success. In other words, descriptive social norms seem to be more 
effective if they involve peers in the same general area or with shared circumstances, a 
finding that has been replicated by Goldstein, Cialdini and Griskevicius (2008).  
Commitment nudges, such as setting an energy conservation goal (e.g. McCalley & Midden, 
2002), function in part due to the social pressure involved with making promises, the desire 
to remain behaviourally consistent and the social power of reciprocity (Cialdini, 2007, 
Chapter 3). Failing to fulfil a commitment also induces a state of cognitive dissonance, which 
we actively avoid by aligning actual behaviour with behavioural intent and attitude. Experi-
mental research suggests that even self-imposed commitments made in private can posi-
tively impact behaviour (Dolan et al., 2010, p. 26). For instance, augmenting a goal with an 
implementation intention — i.e., designating a time and place to fulfil the goal — can in-
crease use of public transport (Bamberg, 2002).     
Active Choice 
Active choice or prompted choice nudges purposefully frame decisions without including a 
default. This activating nudge forces the nudgee to deliberately pick from various options. 
Active choice is pushed by some academics as a less controversial and thus more ethically 
palatable alternative to strictly opt-out framing nudges such as green defaults (see for in-
stance Gigerenzer, 2015).  
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It is important to note that not all nudge examples fit perfectly into the typology outlined 
above and some could arguably fall under two or more of the six proposed categories. For 
instance, while not commonly used for environmental aims, simplification nudges are design 
nudges that frame complicated decisions in simple terms. Simplification is thus an activating 
(or de-biasing) nudge because it helps individuals avoid cognitive fatigue and the likelihood 
of falling prey to a System 1 bias (European Commission, 2016, p. 16).  Similarly, large-scale 
changes to the choice architecture — e.g., a higher collection frequency for kerbside recy-
cling than trash — also fall under the heading of green design but fall just outside our typol-
ogy. 
3.4 Should we nudge for the environment? 
At this point, we have covered the theory and background of nudging, embedding this within 
the context of environmental policy. Furthermore, we presented a typology of green nudges, 
describing each nudge with examples of its applied use. At face value, it may seem that 
green nudges are well suited to address environmental problems and in some cases may be 
more promising than conventional policy instruments. Nevertheless, policymakers require 
an evaluative framework in order to adequately assess the potential of nudging to meet 
environmental goals. This framework must consider practical aspects such as the efficacy 
and effectiveness of the instrument, but also the many ethical considerations that pertain 
to public policy-induced nudging. Indeed, as a unique addition to the typical environmental 
policy toolkit, green nudging cannot be readily evaluated using traditional strategies. Eval-
uating green nudges calls for new lines of thinking, which reflect the numerous disparities 
between nudge-based policies and conventional policy instruments. 
Before we turn to the evaluative framework, it is important to say a few words on our nor-
mative approach going forward. In this paper, we ask the question: Should we nudge for the 
environment? We have decided to focus our operations on green nudging as a means, a 
mechanism or tool to induce sustainable behaviour and lifestyles. This normative stance 
assumes the ends of green nudging to be justified; that is, we assume that achieving envi-
ronmental policy goals is broadly accepted as a good thing for society. We contend that this 
precondition is at least partially justified because countries all over the world have pursued 
environmental aims for decades, with increasing intensity — a trend that is likely to continue 
into the foreseeable future with more and more emphasis on the international level (e.g. 
UN institutions such as the recently adopted Paris Agreement). Moreover, political momen-
tum is usually mirrored by public acceptance particularly in environmentally progressive 
countries, like Germany, where nearly one in five individuals sees environmental and climate 
protection as the number one problem facing society and policymakers (BMUB, 2017, p. 15). 
The same survey research found that 66% of the German population demand that the gov-
ernment do more to protect the environment (BMUB, 2017, p. 22). Finally, if we begin to 
doubt the assumption that environmental protection is a desirable end, this would mean 
that we must question the worth of all environmental policies, not just green nudging. Our 
normative stance operationalises nudging as a means and thus enables us to omit any further 
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discussion of the political philosophy of libertarian paternalism, insofar as it pertains to 
questions about desirable ends. Nevertheless, we are aware that the aforementioned as-
sumptions are debatable and accordingly some of these issues resurface in our discussion of 
ethics in Section 4.2.3. 
4 Research design 
In the following, we outline this paper’s research approach. First, the conceptualisation and 
methodology are presented, which includes necessary background information about policy 
evaluation in general as well as an introduction to our evaluation criteria. Second, our eval-
uative framework is explained in more depth, drawing on findings from a comprehensive 
literature review to illustrate the importance of each criterion and sub-criterion. Third, we 
justify the choice of our criteria, noting possible limitations. With the development of this 
evaluative framework it is our hope to contribute to the early stages of the implementation 
of a policy that has the potential to augment and change environmental policymaking. 
4.1 Conceptualisation and methodological approach 
Policy evaluation represents an important stage in the traditional policy cycle and facilitates 
the analytical structuring and better understanding of political processes (Jann & Erich, 
2009, p. 97). In the specific field of environmental policies and environmental policy instru-
ments, several distinct evaluation approaches exist. Depending on the evaluator’s inten-
tions, different approaches serve different purposes. A side effect evaluation for instance, 
is a “qualitative categorization of effects” and allows evaluators to look at “anticipated and 
unanticipated effects” of a policy as well as whether these effects “occur inside or outside 
the target area” (Hilden et al., 2002, p. 15). It is thus a useful tool for analysing an estab-
lished environmental policy instrument. For our purposes, side effects play a role because 
in the contested field of nudging, anticipated and unanticipated effects can occur.  Any 
investigation of unanticipated effects, however, will be limited due to the fact that our 
evaluation only represents a preliminary ‘glimpse’ of two types of nudges. Furthermore, only 
a limited evaluation of unanticipated effects is possible since the development of green 
nudging in the public policy realm is still in its early stages. 
Another relevant type of evaluation, which serves as a valuable base for our research, is the 
evaluation of ‘recently introduced policy instruments’ (Mickwitz, 2003, p. 421). Nudging as 
a public policy instrument in the environmental realm has just recently been introduced and 
thus requires an analysis that differs from ex ante or ex post evaluations. An ex ante policy 
evaluation assumes that no empirical tests of available experiences exist whereas ex post 
policy evaluations require data regarding the outcome and unanticipated effects (Mickwitz, 
2003, p. 421). Neither holds true for a recently introduced policy instrument such as nudging. 
In this sense, our approach differs from an integrated policy instrument evaluation. We do 
not conduct our own empirical tests and produce data but rely on primary literature to 
provide us with the relevant information. Due to this, we do not intend to focus on efficiency 
or cost-effectiveness/cost-benefit analysis. Even though we agree with the statement that 
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economic criteria are important and should be part of an in-depth, integrative policy instru-
ment evaluation (Hilden et al., 2002, p. 16), it does not seem suitable to include this in our 
evaluative framework. Data limitations make it difficult to acquire the knowledge needed 
to give adequate recommendations this early in policy development. Therefore, we decide 
to focus instead on three criteria linked to the democratic realm of environmental policy 
and which we deem to be specifically important for nudging. Finally, in this paper we take 
a proactive evaluation approach, meaning that our research is conducted to “serve decision 
makers” planning by “delineating, obtaining and providing information” (Gave-May & Pal, 
1999, pp. 265–266).  
In terms of methodology, our evaluation consists of a literature review embedded in a con-
ceptual frame deducted from different environmental policy evaluations. The preliminary 
evaluation we perform focuses solely on two types of nudges (green social norms and green 
defaults) rather than on green nudging more broadly. As researchers, we recognise the fact 
that politics and values go hand in hand with the evaluation of public policy. As Gave-May 
and Pal (1999) stated “data have to be interpreted and filtered through values of some sort 
that help us determine what is significant and what is not” (p. 260). While we understand 
this limitation, a full treatment of these post-structuralism concerns is beyond the scope of 
this research project. 
4.2 Evaluative framework 
In this section, we start by providing an in-depth overview of our evaluative framework and 
its three main criteria — efficacy, effectiveness and ethics. All three criteria and associated 
sub-criteria are presented in Table 2 and are subsequently defined and discussed.  
4.2.1 Efficacy 
Before implementing a new policy instrument, social scientists as well as policymakers often 
underestimate the importance of efficacy. In fact, while every stakeholder involved in the 
implementation of new social policy should be aware of the necessity of sound research and 
testing, this is not always the case. In the past, in the field of public policy, decent efficacy 
trials have often been neglected, with policymakers introducing a new policy without know-
ing if the policy does in fact work. This failure to incorporate efficacy has several explana-
tions, such as the complexity of society and the problem and challenge of generalising on a 
large scale. Another possible reason has to do with practical feasibility; it is not possible to 
conduct experimental trials for each new policy suggestion. However, due to the complexity 
of environmental problems and the empirical foundations of nudge theory, we contend that 
it is vital and possible to test green nudging as a new type of policy instrument in regard to 
its functionality and efficacy.  
The efficacy of a public policy instrument is confirmed by scrutinising interventions under 
optimal conditions in a lab setting and evaluating whether the positive effects of a pro-
gramme outweigh its potential harms, or as Flay et al. (2005) state: “Efficacy refers to the 
beneficial effects of a programme or policy under optimal conditions of delivery” (p. 3). The 
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standard scenario or efficacy test of a social policy uses randomised experiments or trials. 
Several alternative techniques, such as case studies or analyses of statistical evidence are 
used in the field of social science as well. However, as mentioned by John et al. (2013) 
“experiments — especially Randomized Controlled Trials [RCT, emphasis added] — offer a 
much more valid and robust standard of evidence than any other method policymakers have 
available” (p. 28). Particularly in the fields of behavioural economics and experimental psy-
chology, experiments are the standard method of inquiry. Experiments test the effects of a 
new policy instrument or policy interventions on a small population subset, or sample (Vo-
yeur, 2015, p. 10). While running experiments, it is of great importance to keep in mind the 
drawbacks of generalisation and the importance of validity. In their book Nudge, Nudge, 
Think, Think, John et al. (2011) differentiate between three types of validity: general va-
lidity, external validity and internal validity (p. 29). Table 3 demonstrates the meaning and 
the differences between the three, which should be taken into consideration by any policy-
maker or evaluator. 
Table 2: Evaluative framework for green nudging 
Criteria Sub-Criteria 
Efficacy • Theoretical basis 
• Reliable methods (internal validity) 
• Replication (external validity/general validity) 
Effectiveness • Generalisability 
• Practicability 
• Longevity  
• Outcome/Impact 
• Side Effects 
Ethics • Autonomy  
• Manipulation 
• Transparency  
• Proportionality 
 
The importance of efficacy in the context of policy implementation is out of question. Cri-
teria by which to measure efficacy in the context of green nudging, however, have not yet 
been fully developed in the literature. The current research defines and measures efficacy, 
pulling from existing literature in a diverse array of fields. Due to the complex nature of 
environmental problems and hence environmental policy, conditions of pure efficacy trials 
might turn out to be more difficult than in other fields. This fact has to be kept in mind 
during future efficacy trials (Mickwitz, 2003, p. 416). In this paper, we divide the efficacy 
of green nudging into three sub-criteria based on the three dimensions of validity (see eval-
uative framework overview in Table 2): theoretical basis, reliable methods or internal va-
lidity and replication or external/general validity. 
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As a theoretical basis, there are four stages of research that Flay (1986) proposes for a 
programme or policy to be well planned. Although he focuses on health and education pro-
grammes specifically, we argue that the four stages are useful to plan a green nudge efficacy 
trial as well. Stage (1) is as simple as conducting basic research on the policy field of interest 
and similar existing programmes and is followed by stage (2), the development of a hypoth-
esis. Once sound theoretical and empirical ground is laid, Flay (1986) advocates for the pro-
vision of studies in the form of applied (3) pilot research and (4) prototypes (p. 459).  
Table 3: Three types of validity for the efficacy of policy interventions 
General Validity 
The extent to which the findings of an experiment or line of research can be 
generalised to different contexts and circumstances other than those of the 
original study. 
External Validity 
The extent to which it is possible to make inferences from an experiment or 
line of research. 
Internal Validity 
The extent to which it is possible in an experiment or line of research to 
conclude a hypothesized relationship or finding, i.e., whether it is possible 
to explain empirical findings. 
Source: John et al. (2011), p. 29.  
An answer to the question of whether an intervention is efficacious or not can only be given 
with the help of different kinds of reliable methods. Depending on the circumstances, these 
methods consist of different types of experiments. Experiments can be conducted in a la-
boratory setting or under real-life conditions. Efficacy, however, only concerns experiments 
conducted in the laboratory or under highly controlled, laboratory-like circumstances. The 
natural and social sciences differentiate between two types of experiments: true experi-
ments and quasi experiments. A true experiment requires the random selection of partici-
pants and the random assignment of these participants to either control or treatment groups. 
Furthermore, true experiments are characterised by the manipulation of independent vari-
able(s) in order to measure the outcome and function and to show cause-and-effect rela-
tionships. While making a hypothesis based on a theoretical literature review, scientists ma-
nipulate the hypothesised independent variable to affect the outcome. This action is typi-
cally referred to as an intervention. Quasi experiments do not assign their participants ran-
domly because it is either not possible or practical, such as is the case when investigating 
differences between demographic groups (Gribbons & Herman, 1997, pp. 1–5). Before run-
ning a scientific experiment or trial, one of the main conditions for scientifically sound data 
and information in efficacy processes is the obtainment and specification of the sample. 
Who is part of the randomised sample group and how well do they represent the affected 
population of a policy instrument? As stated above, generalisation and the problem of valid-
ity have to be taken into consideration while conducting efficacy trials. When thinking about 
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reliable methods and replication, policymakers and evaluators have to be aware that exper-
iments or trials differ when it comes to their internal or external/general validity (John et 
al., 2011, p. 36). 
Nudging, as a newly introduced environmental policy instrument, is an interesting case since 
trials might not be possible for every type of environmental nudge at the early stage of the 
policy. Sometimes it proves difficult to run fully randomised trials and therefore quasi ex-
periments in the form of design experiments might be useful and appropriate for policymak-
ers and evaluators. Design experiments come into play if there is still little known about an 
intervention. Such experiments serve as the foundation for future RCTs as they give decision 
makers an overview of what works. Anyone who conducts a design experiment has to deal 
with the question: What is the point of my study? (Cobb, Confrey, diSessa, Lehrer & Schau-
ble, 2003, p. 11). John et al. (2011) define design experiments as a “qualitative experiment, 
which focuses on the design of an intervention as the thing to get right. The experimental 
aspect of the method manipulates an intervention and observes it over an extended time 
period, usually in one location, until acceptable results emerge” (p. 38).  
RCTs are usually considered the “gold standard […] that offer a genuine counterfactual of 
what would have happened without the intervention […]” (John et al., 2011, p. 33). A sample 
group is randomly selected from a population of interest and categorised randomly into in-
tervention and control groups. Randomisation is essential to ensure similarity in all respects 
and account for possible confounding variables — i.e., randomisation ensures that co-varying 
factors are spread between the control and treatment conditions. For an intervention to be 
considered efficacious and valid, the sample must show statistically unbiased estimates and 
no serious negative effects on the outcome can occur (John et al., 2011, p. 32). Each exper-
imental result must be reported accurately and consistently, regardless of whether it is pos-
itive, negative or non-significant. After the initial experiment, the same manipulation or 
intervention can be repeated at a later point in time with a new sample. This procedure is 
called replication. Replication is an important efficacy tool, as it adds to the external/gen-
eral validity and generalisability of an experimental finding. The person who conducts the 
replication need not be the same researcher. Additionally, the replication can either copy 
the original study by holding all conditions unchanged or attempt to show that the empirical 
findings are valid under multiple conditions (i.e. for cross-cultural studies). Here, however, 
the line between tests of efficacy and effectiveness becomes very fine and often overlaps, 
since replications can be conducted under real-life settings as well. Such natural experi-
mentation or pilot testing investigates the effectiveness and not the efficacy of a policy 
intervention. 
Efficacy lays the foundation for an effective public policy. Ideally it contributes to careful 
research and experimentation. Effectiveness in the real-world setting, however, requires a 
different set of evaluative criteria, which we discuss in the following section. 
36 N. Evans, S. Eickers, L. Geene, M. Todorovic, A. Villmow 
 
4.2.2 Effectiveness 
One of the central foci in the emerging academic literature on environmental policy instru-
ment evaluation and on behavioural policy tools is effectiveness (Glasgow, Lichtenstein & 
Marcus, 2003; Mickwitz, 2003; Schubert, 2016; Steg & Vlek, 2009). Mickwitz (2003) under-
lines the European Union’s emphasis on effectiveness in environmental policy evaluation, 
highlighting the Environmental Action Programme for the European Union (1600/2002/EC), 
Article 10 (European Council, 2002). “Possible impacts” on the environment and “effective-
ness of existing measures” are to be evaluated by policymakers (Mickwitz, 2003, p. 416). 
But what exactly does effectiveness mean in this context? What criteria can be used to 
measure the effectiveness of an environmental policy tool such as a green nudge? 
What efficacy and effectiveness have in common is that they are both used to evaluate 
whether a policy intervention leads to the desired outcome. However, efficacy is usually 
tested first to identify whether the policy works in a lab setting. In a second step, the impact 
in the real world must be assessed. A programme cannot be considered effective if tests for 
efficacy fail to detect a positive effect in the first place, meaning that interventions have 
to be shown to do more good than harm in order to be suitable for an effectiveness evalua-
tion (Flay, 1986, p. 454). Efficacy and effectiveness are therefore closely connected and 
account for a significant part of a policy evaluation. As explained by Nathan, Stuart and 
Dolan (2000), “Efficacy studies emphasize internal validity and replicability; effectiveness 
studies emphasize external validity and generalizability” (p. 965). 
The question asked in this context is whether a policy produces the intended effects within 
a broader population (Glasgow et al., 2003, p. 1262). Flay et al. (2005) add to the definition 
of effectiveness by describing it as the “level of good over harm (or benefits over costs) that 
a programme achieves when received under typical real-world conditions of availability and 
acceptance” (p. 468). Steg and Vlek (2008) point out that there is a research gap in the 
evaluation of policy interventions other than informational strategies. Thus, this holds true 
for behavioural policy instruments such as green nudges. According to Steg and Vlek (2008), 
these instruments need to be evaluated for effectiveness as well, since they are potentially 
important tools to enhance pro-environmental behaviour.  
In conclusion, effectiveness as a criterion in policy evaluation plays an important role and 
can be defined as coherence between intended results and actual outcomes. Yet what cri-
teria can policymakers use in order to ensure that a green nudge is effective? An effective-
ness trial can be called successful only if the policy has robustly gone through a range of 
settings with various participants, conditions and audiences, resulting in the intended out-
comes. Glasgow et al. (2003) have listed a spectrum of characteristics that play an essential 
role in effectiveness trials. A policy instrument is effective if it reaches an extensive part of 
the population, if it can be applied in different social settings (for example both at work and 
in schools) by different trained staff and if it has long-term effects that are replicable. 
Moreover, negative side effects should be kept to a minimum and costs should be low (Glas-
gow et al., 2003, p. 1264). Similarly, Steg and Vlek (2008) suggest that the effectiveness of 
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policies with single or multiple intervention strategies should be researched through exper-
imental research designs that include control groups and monitor changes in behaviour over 
a long period (p. 314). 
According to Flay et al. (2005), a successful effectiveness trial is characterized by a list of 
criteria that add to a successful efficacy trial. In line with the above given criteria by Glas-
gow et al. (2003), one important principle is to facilitate the trial in a way that third parties 
are able to undertake the policy implementation. Furthermore, evaluation must take place 
under real-world conditions, involving the tested population groups in the intervention and 
its control. In addition, the practical relevance of the outcome needs to be demonstrated 
and explanations of how the outcome for a specific group can be generalised should be given 
(Flay et al., 2005, p. 19). With regard to methodological standards in effectiveness trials, 
Flay et al. (2005) maintain that they should be the same as in efficacy trials, with a prefer-
ence for randomisation (for example RCTs). However, the authors acknowledge that main-
taining the same standards is a challenge in real-world situations. Nevertheless, it is desira-
ble to establish high quality effectiveness trials, which for instance can be achieved through 
a pilot stage in which the initial policy developer is not involved. Avoiding the use of re-
sources that are not available in reality is a criterion that ensures practical importance of 
the effectiveness trial (Flay et al., 2005, pp. 12-14). 
One tool to evaluate the effectiveness of nudging as an environmental policy instrument is 
the field experiment. As with the discussion of efficacy experiments above, it is important 
to distinguish between true experiments and quasi experiments. Field experiments often 
count as true experiments outside of laboratory settings. They provide policymakers with a 
useful tool to conduct sound research and tackle policy questions, since they differ from 
laboratory experimentation. As the name already suggests, field experiments consist of ex-
perimentation and fieldwork. The experimentation strategy constitutes random assignment 
of observed units to treatment or control groups. As with RCTs, randomisation ensures equal 
starting conditions and equal expectations. Field experiments are similar to natural experi-
ments in that both occur outside the laboratory. However, natural experiments are consid-
ered quasi experiments conducted outside of a laboratory setting — thus randomisation and 
independent variable manipulation are not always possible. Gerber and Green (2011) de-
scribe natural experimentation as: “[representing] a deliberate departure from observa-
tional investigation, in which researchers attempt to draw causal inferences from naturally 
occurring variation as opposed to variation generated through random assignment” (p. 1). 
John et al. (2013) argue that external validity might be weak due to a limited scope of trials 
and the lack of experimental control (pp. 34–35; see also Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 2008, p. 
66). However, this does not necessarily hold true if trials are replicated at different times, 
within different contexts and for different populations, facilitating the accumulation of 
knowledge.  
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Two additional aspects of a green nudge’s effectiveness are that it should be generalisable 
and it needs to show long-term effects. Policy developers aim to see long-term effects at-
tributed to green nudges, but these are tied to another condition: The achieved outcomes 
of a nudge need to correspond to the intended goals (Mickwitz, 2003, p. 426). As Flay et al. 
(2005) put it, the policies have to be “ready for dissemination so that they can be imple-
mented effectively, that is, in a manner that achieves the expected effects” (p. 3). Thus, a 
nudge is only effective if it results in the anticipated outcome. The effectiveness trial helps 
to test implementation quality and consequently fosters the achievement of an anticipated 
and desired outcome (Flay et al., 2005, p. 3). 
A problem in this context is the occurrence of unanticipated side effects. Already in the 
efficacy trial it is recommended to measure potential side effects and to observe negative 
outcomes unrelated to the intended ones (Flay et al., 2005, p. 6). The effectiveness trial is 
the essential next step because in the real world, there may be outcomes that the policy 
developers did not foresee. This holds especially true for green nudges and the environmen-
tal policy domain, since they aim for a positive outcome in a very complex system where 
effects often become apparent only after a long period of time. Glasgow et al. (2003) agree 
with, and underline, Flay’s concern for the “measurement of potential harmful outcomes”, 
which in their opinion has not sufficiently been addressed in the testing of effectiveness (p. 
1264). 
Besides the focus on the outcome of a green nudge, another effectiveness criterion that we 
briefly mention above is its practical relevance. This is closely connected to the nudge’s 
impact. What Flay et al. (2005) claim for health policies is just as relevant for environmental 
policies: Interventions can only have a significant impact if they are relevant in practise (p. 
11). Therefore, it is not enough to test a nudge in the theoretical framework of an efficacy 
trial, but to additionally assess it in different settings in the real world. Flay et al. (2005) 
further suggest reporting on the impact of the findings during the effectiveness trial. The 
practical value of the impact can amongst other things be measured in the form of stand-
ardised effect sizes, confidence intervals or odds ratios (Flay et al., 2005, p. 15). In their 
chapter Testing, John et al. (2011) point out the importance of the evaluation of impact to 
ensure effectiveness as well. They propose the use of conventional social sciences methods, 
for example case studies and statistical analysis or comparisons, to evaluate the impact of 
a nudge. According to the authors, RCTs are the most powerful method to investigate 
whether a nudge has the intended impact. 
To sum up, we have collected a selection of criteria that assure a sound effectiveness trial. 
If we want a green nudge to be effective, the precondition is that it must successfully pass 
the efficacy trial. In the actual effectiveness trial, various other criteria need to be consid-
ered. As an agglomeration of the scholarly definitions above, effectiveness in our evaluative 
framework includes the following principles (Table 2): generalisability (can the audience, 
setting and implementation be applied beyond an initial experiment?), practicability (is ef-
fectiveness tested in a real-world setting?), longevity (long-term effects), outcome/impact 
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(does the nudge lead to the desired behavioural outcome and a positive impact on the envi-
ronment?) and side effects (unanticipated and anticipated). 
4.2.3 Ethics 
In the case of nudging and specifically in the field of green nudging, ethics plays a significant 
role even though it falls by the wayside in standard evaluative approaches. A more integra-
tive evaluative frame would serve future evaluators and policymakers in discussions on 
whether to employ green nudging. As discussed above, green nudging does not fit into the 
traditional policy toolkit, primarily because its mechanisms function within the unconscious 
mode of System 1. Purely focusing on efficacy and effectiveness is, therefore, not sufficient 
in answering the question: Should we nudge for the environment? In this section we provide 
a summary of the leading ethical criticisms in order to provide a necessary overview of the 
current state of debate. The ethical arguments discussed below, form the basis for our eval-
uative criteria, which is summarised in Table 4.  
Table 4: Criteria for an ethical evaluation of green nudges 
To start, nudging has been widely criticised on the basis that it infringes upon one’s own 
autonomy. We understand autonomy to “[…] refer to the capacity to be one's own person, 
to live one's life according to reasons and motives that are taken as one's own and not the 
product of manipulative or distorting external forces” (Christman, 2015). Fischer and Lotz 
(2014) discuss the ethical legitimacy of behavioural policy measures in their report Is Soft 
Paternalism Ethically Legitimate?, identifying freedom of action and freedom of will (au-
tonomy) as vital relevant ethical criteria in the discussion of nudging as a policy instrument. 
Smith, Goldstein and Johnson (2013) further argue that the focus should be placed on con-
sumer welfare, more specifically to what degree it is maximised in relation to the level of 
loss of autonomy (p. 161). 
Autonomy The capacity to be one's own person, to live one's life according to rea-
sons and motives that are taken as one's own and not the product of 
manipulative or distorting external forces 
Manipulation The attempt to influence people subconsciously or unconsciously, in a 
way that undermines their capacity for conscious choice 
Transparency The intention behind a nudge, as well as the means by which behavioural 
change is pursued, is apparent to the agent being nudged 
Proportional-
ity 
Must fulfil four elements: serve a legitimate aim; nudge needs to be 
suitable; must be the least restrictive means; nudge needs to be ade-
quate 
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Schubert (2016) conducts an ethical assessment of green nudges, offering some critical 
guidelines that may help practitioners come to an ethically informed assessment. The author 
argues that central to an ethical assessment of green nudges is the level to which it compro-
mises people’s autonomy, its impact on ‘self-legislation’ and the fairness of the nudge (p. 
5). He proposes that autonomy considerations should enter the overall ethical assessment of 
green nudging as one kind of ‘normative cost’, to be weighed against benefits in terms of, 
for example, welfare. He concludes that transparency, coupled with the condition that the 
nudge generate durable behavioural change, is a key prerequisite for effective and ethical 
green nudging (Schubert, 2016, p. 29). 
Although philosophers Hausman and Welch (2010) share Thaler and Sunstein’s (2008) opinion 
that nudging (e.g. the establishment of default settings) does not restrict freedom of action 
or reduce individual utility, they do however argue that nudging remains harmful. Hausman 
and Welch (2010) hold that autonomy, defined as the deliberative process that brings about 
an individual’s own preferences, is infringed. The authors conclude that it is problematic 
when decisions reflect the tactics employed by the choice architect because the degree of 
control over one’s own mental processes is therein reduced, leading to preferences that in 
a certain sense are not one’s own. Here the problem is not regarded as restricting a person’s 
freedom to act, as Schnellenbach (2012) reasons, but rather as restricting freedom of will. 
Nudges can, however, promote as well as violate people’s autonomy. This particular phe-
nomenon will be discussed in more detail in the evaluation section of this paper. 
One key component that emerges from contemporary philosophical autonomy theory is what 
Dworkin (1988) calls the “independent procedure requirement” (p. 18). The intricacies of 
this requirement cannot be discussed here in detail; suffice it to say that it holds that the 
process of arriving at a certain choice must be sufficiently independent from external influ-
ences. In contemporary society, however, our decision will always be subject to a significant 
degree of external input. Therefore, what seems crucial is that these influences be made 
explicit so that the subject can take a critical stance toward them. This concept also claims 
that transparent nudges do in fact generally respect autonomy and are necessary to ensure 
the safeguard of autonomy and democratic decision making (Alemanno, Sibony & Sunstein, 
2015). 
In the literature, the term manipulation is used both as a value-neutral, technical concept 
to simply mean ‘intentional change’ and as a value-laden, normative term. While the former 
aims to understand manipulation as a specific type of influence (putting aside the question 
whether it is good or bad), the latter assumes that there is something inherently wrong with 
manipulation. In this view, manipulation is primarily wrong because of the implied violation 
of autonomy.10 Nudgees (those being nudged) are not in full control of their behaviour. They 
                                            
 
10  Conly (2013) explains further: “Libertarian Paternalism is manipulative. That is, it does 
not suggest that we engage in free and open discussion in order to rationally persuade 
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are not doing the choosing themselves, there is no real self-determination and, hence, their 
autonomy is undermined. Wilkinson (2013) includes the potentially wrong-making qualities 
of manipulation: 
“Manipulation is intentionally and successfully influencing someone using meth-
ods that pervert choice […] Nudging clearly could satisfy the condition of having 
an intentional actor who successfully influences someone’s decisions. In princi-
ple, nudging could also pervert someone’s decision-making process and thereby 
infringe upon his or her autonomy. But if and when nudging does not use a per-
verting method, it is not manipulation. If and when nudging is not a form of in-
tentional influence, it is not manipulation. If and when nudging does not succeed 
in altering behavior, it is not manipulation” (p. 347). 
Even if we consider manipulation wrong because it impairs an individual’s autonomy, this 
does not necessarily mean that all nudges are manipulative. After all, a nudge can fail to 
meet one of the necessary conditions. In turn, this is not to say that a non-manipulative 
nudge is perfectly justified, as it can also be wrong for other reasons. Nevertheless, Nys and 
Engelen (2016) argue that there can be instances of justified manipulation (pp. 4-8). 
Sunstein (2015), on the other hand, argues that an action does not count as manipulative 
merely because it is an effort to alter people’s behaviour (p. 443). Although he does describe 
that when one is manipulated, one is being treated as a kind of “puppet on a string”, and 
further states that no one wants to be someone’s puppet, and it is especially bad to be a 
puppet of government (Sunstein, 2015, p. 443). The author concludes that even with full 
transparency, at least some degree of manipulation may be involved whenever a choice 
architect is targeting emotions or seeking a formulation that will be effective because of 
how it interacts with people’s intuitive or automatic thinking (System 1) (Sunstein, 2015, p. 
447). 
However, it is frequently claimed that nudges generally and regularly count as manipulative. 
Conly (2013), for instance, believes that when we nudge we no longer regard people as 
generally capable of making good choices, and we out manoeuvre them by appealing to their 
irrationality, just in more fruitful ways (p. 30). She further argues that “we concede that 
people do not generally make good decisions when left to their own devices, and this runs 
against the basic premise of liberalism, which is that we are basically rational, prudent 
creatures who may thus, and should thus, direct themselves autonomously” (Conly, 2013, p. 
30). 
                                            
 
you to change your ways. […] The point of the nudge is to push you in ways that bypass 
your reasoning. That is, they use your cognitive biases, like your tendency to go with the 
default option, to bring about good effects. There is a sense in which they fail to respect 
people’s decision-making ability […]” (p. 30). 
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Ethical criticisms often focus on the claim that it is morally relevant who is doing the nudg-
ing. White (2013) gives two reasons why it is problematic for governments to nudge us (p. 
51). First, there is the information and epistemic issue of whether government agencies and 
bureaucrats can accurately know our reflective judgements. Why are the manipulators in a 
better position than the manipulated to know what people really want? Why should the ma-
nipulators be trusted with this kind of judgement and power? Secondly, while we expect 
such manipulation from private companies, we do not expect it from governments and this 
can make us extremely vulnerable to it (White, 2013, p. 51). 
For the purpose of our evaluation, we will be using Sunstein’s (2015) definition, where a 
nudge is “manipulative if it attempts to influence people subconsciously or unconsciously, 
in a way that undermines their capacity for conscious choice” (p. 443). We will, however, 
be evaluating the level of manipulation through a framework established by Hansen and 
Jespersen (2013). The framework was established to serve as a tool for the responsible use 
of the nudge approach to behavioural change, and evaluates whether a nudge is manipula-
tive or not, by examining how transparent it is, as well as whether the nudge pertains to a 
choice (reflective thinking) or not (Hansen & Jespersen, 2013, pp. 23-27). Transparency is 
particularly critical when evaluating nudging in the public sector, since it lacks the usual 
safeguards that accompany law making (White, 2013). Sunstein (2015) himself has addressed 
the need for transparency, stating, “an action counts as manipulative if it lacks transpar-
ency” (p. 443).  
Hansen and Jespersen (2013) maintain that standard policy tools are seldom transparent, 
arguing that a transparent nudge is when the citizen being nudged, reasonably understands 
the intention behind it. A non-transparent nudge works in a way that the citizen being 
nudged cannot perceive the means by which the behavioural change is pursued (Hansen & 
Jespersen, 2013, p. 17). Hansen and Jespersen's (2013) perspective is contested, notably by 
Lepenies and Malecka (2016), on the basis that citizens — although they may understand 
they are being nudged — are likely to not fully comprehend the issue in its entirety: A nudge 
is the outcome of a process designed to influence citizens behaviour in order to achieve a 
certain policy outcome. Lepenies and Malecka’s (2016) perspective thus renders all nudges 
as non-transparent, and as such, for the purpose of our evaluation, we will use Hansen und 
Jespersen’s (2013) definition: A “[…] transparent nudge is defined as a nudge provided in 
such a way that the intention behind it, as well as the means by which behavioural change 
is pursued, could reasonably be expected to be transparent to the agent being nudged as a 
result of the intervention” (p. 17).  
Furthermore, interventions need to be proportionate to the gravity of the behaviour and 
corresponding impacts they are trying to change. The legality of nudging has received some 
attention in the literature (e.g. Alemanno et al., 2015; Lepenies & Małecka, 2015), but the 
question remains as to whether governments may be obliged to nudge for environmental 
purposes. Although the evaluation of proportionality may not traditionally fall under the 
umbrella of an ethical evaluation, we have decided to include it here since we deem green 
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nudges to serve justified ends. Therefore, we contend that a means-based ethical evaluation 
of nudging equates proportionality with autonomy, manipulation, and transparency. 
Proportionality has been a concept of law for an extensive period of time and is primarily 
used in assessing whether an intervention is constitutional, i.e., is the intervention in con-
flict with fundamental democratic values such as interference with individual rights. It is 
found in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Art. 52(1)) and plays a 
vital role in the adjudication of the European Court of Human Rights (Schweizer, 2016, p. 
4). The level of scrutiny applied when assessing the proportionality of a measure differs 
greatly between jurisdictions; therefore, a discussion of the application of the principle of 
proportionality to nudging must remain at a very abstract level. Although this limits its use-
fulness greatly, we believe this to still be an extremely important criterion. For the purpose 
of an evaluation of nudging as a policy instrument, we will limit ourselves to the principle 
of proportionality in the context of fundamental rights. Any other applications of the prin-
ciple of proportionality do not relate to nudging. 
The principle of proportionality will be discussed here as a four-prong test that assesses (1) 
whether the measure serves a legitimate public interest, (2) whether a measure interfering 
with a right is suitable to achieve its objective, (3) whether it is necessary for that purpose 
and (4) whether it excessively burdens the individual compared with the benefits it aims to 
secure (Schweizer, 2015, p. 5). 
1. A legitimate public interest can be any economic, cultural or social purpose. For 
instance, the protection of minors, minorities, socially disadvantaged persons, public 
health, the environment or the advancement of families or gender equality are all 
examples of legitimate public interests (Schweizer, 2015). The measure must be 
aimed at preventing social harm or a negative externality. Since we are purely dis-
cussing environmental nudges in this paper, we conclude that all nudges discussed 
here serve a legitimate public interest in the form of protecting the environment. 
We will, therefore, not examine the first prong in our evaluation of green nudges. 
2. A measure is deemed suitable when it is, at least in principle, possible that it furthers 
the stated public goal (Schweizer, 2015, p. 15). It does not need to be the optimal 
means to further the public interest; it merely has to have the abstract potential to 
help achieve the goal. Few legislative measures ever fail this prong of the propor-
tionality principle. The evidence that nudging works to some degree is overwhelming, 
and this is all that is required under the suitability test (we return to this point in our 
preliminary evaluation; see also the Annex for selected empirical examples of nudges 
in practice). 
3. A means can be argued to be required (or necessary) when there is no other means 
available that is equally suitable to further the public interest (Schweizer, 2015, p. 
16). When there are several equally effective means to achieve a given objective the 
state is required to choose the “mildest means”, i.e., the intervention least restric-
tive of personal liberties (van Aaken, 2015, p. 5). A measure can be described as less 
restrictive, for instance, if it interferes less intensely with a given fundamental right, 
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or affects fewer people. Schweizer (2015) argues that a nudge is generally less re-
strictive than a coercive measure (p. 16). He explains this by examining the facilita-
tion of environmentally sustainable food in cafeterias. A measure could force the 
canteen operators to provide tongs rather than spoons for environmentally unsustain-
able food items. The coercive alternative of banning certain foods altogether, or 
increasing their price by taxation, is more coercive on the consumer, and equally or 
even more coercive on the operator. 
4. The last prong of the proportionality test requires the undesired effects to be 
weighed against the importance of the public interest the means seek to achieve. 
Balancing requires “that the weight of the interference must not be disproportionate 
to the weight of the justifying reasons” (Schweizer, 2015, p. 19). The balancing test 
does not require that the measure is proportionate; it only requires that it is not 
disproportionate (Schweizer, 2015, p. 19). Considerable effort has been spent on 
structuring the balancing test and making it more predictable. For the purpose of 
this evaluation we will be using the balancing test by Alexy (2003), in which affected 
interests are grouped into three categories: ‘little’, ‘intermediate’ and ‘most’ worth 
protecting  (pp. 780-789). In his analysis, Alexy (2003) argues that the highest cate-
gory is reserved for conditional rights, such as freedom of religion. In the same way, 
Alexy (2003) categorises the public interest(s) the measure seeks to further with the 
protection of constitutional goods having the most weight. This category consists not 
only of the protection of the fundamental rights of others, but also the protection of 
constitutionally mandated public goods, such as the protection of the environment. 
Any legal system that protects liberties is bound by law to use its ‘corrective power’ only 
proportionally and as prescribed by law. Therefore, measures that limit freedoms of any 
kind need to be justified, and when in doubt, one should always choose the mildest possible 
intervention (van Aaken, 2015, p. 4). Furthermore, it is important to note, that although 
coercive or mandated action can be legally challenged, persuasive or invisible measures are 
much harder to contest legally. 
We have intentionally not included the level of intrusiveness, the fairness of the nudge and 
the critique that nudging can compromise citizen’s ability to form preferences in our evalu-
ative framework. All nudges are to some degree intrusive, but the intrusiveness of a green 
nudge, we believe, is already encompassed by the criteria set out in our current framework. 
Concerning the latter two critiques, these are mentioned in the discussion section of our 
paper. We did not believe these to be necessary for our evaluative framework, as they are 
general ethical critiques as opposed to measureable ethical variances between different 
types of green nudges. 
4.3 Methodological limitations and delimitations 
This section serves to highlight potential limitations and delimitations to the current re-
search. 




As the research conducted consists predominantly of a literature review, there is the risk of 
systematic bias within the material reviewed. Particularly studies from the behavioural sci-
ences tend to lean towards a confirmatory bias of the appropriateness of green nudging — 
and fail to account for ethical concerns. Moreover, compared to the discussion on the effec-
tiveness of nudges, ethical questions are not sufficiently addressed in policy circles. Due to 
this observation, we intentionally put an emphasis on ethics compared to the other two 
evaluative criteria and approach the ethical evaluation critically. 
We also observe an overall positive bias in much of the available literature concerning the 
suitability of green nudging. One reason for this is that the topic is relatively new and very 
much centred around the book by Thaler and Sunstein (2008), who are strong proponents of 
the use of nudges in government. In addition, many scientists, who deal with the topic come 
from the private sector where nudging has already been implemented for years at varying 
levels of success. Lastly, there is a danger of overlooking the critical implications of nudging, 
especially with regards to ethical questions. The concept of libertarian paternalism in con-
nection to nudging may create a positive view since it purports to preserve freedom of choice 
and make people happier by increasing welfare. Being aware of these positive biases in the 
literature helps us to actively seek out all positions in the debate and avoid falling in the 
trap of presenting only one perspective. 
In studying the complexity of a policy process, researchers are restrained by cognitive pre-
suppositions that cause them to recognise some aspects of the process and ignore others 
(Weible, 2014, p. 3). This cannot be avoided since illuminating certain aspects automatically 
means dismantling others. Furthermore, any research is confronted with limits in the scope 
of analysis, simply due to limited time resources, limited human capability as well as a lim-
ited amount of space to express the findings. Establishing a framework, as we have done 
here, can be one way to help mitigate such presuppositions and highlight the most important 
elements of the study (Weible, 2014, p. 3). Moreover, intentional limitations in scope can 
also favour more in-depth analysis of the chosen focal points — as long as the focus has been 
justified and reflected upon. 
4.3.2 Delimitations 
There are two preliminary assumptions underlying this paper, which we would like to stress. 
The first one is that we focus our evaluation of green nudging on the question of whether it 
is justified as a means. Thereby, as discussed in Section 3.4, we consider the ends to be 
justified, i.e., we take environmental protection as something worth being pursued. Thus, 
if evaluations suggest that green nudging is a legitimate and suitable policy instrument, the 
nudge would be justified as a means. We are aware of the fact that this assumption is de-
batable. However, we take this step for practical reasons. If we did not do so, we would 
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necessarily have to question environmental policymaking, or the value of environmental in-
tegrity in general before getting around to whether green nudges should be used to pursue 
such interests. 
The current research does not use a complete, already existing evaluation framework be-
cause there is none that can fully cover all the aspects that are relevant when evaluating 
nudging as a policy instrument to tackle environmental problems. As we have shown in Sec-
tion 3.2, nudging does not fit into the traditional environmental policy toolkit. Thus, the 
characteristics that are unique to nudging and new to the policy toolkit must be incorporated 
into the evaluation. Since these were not fully covered by other evaluation frameworks, we 
propose a framework that is tailored to the task of assessing green nudges by inter alia 
considering ethics with more weight than is currently standard. 
The method used to approach the research question of this paper is an in-depth literature 
review. Therefore, we base our argumentation on existing literature pertaining to nudging 
— within and outside of the environmental field. Since the debate around the legitimacy of 
nudging as a policy tool has exploded over the last few years, there is a large amount of 
literature to be reviewed. Yet, not all the discussion takes place in an academic setting, as 
the topic has attracted great attention in the public sphere. Thus, in conducting our evalu-
ation we investigated a mix of different kinds of literature on the topic — primary, second-
ary, popular, academic, working and discussion papers as well as technical reports and policy 
briefs by government institution — in order to cover the full research spectrum. 
Finally, the cases of nudging we discuss come predominantly from the OECD countries. Fu-
ture research could broaden the geographical scope. 
5 A policy evaluation framework for nudging 
Within the typology of nudges (Figure 2), two types clearly stand out in the literature: de-
faults and social norms. In the following, we use the framework outlined above to provide a 
preliminary evaluation of different cases of these two nudges in the environmental field. 
Unlike traditional evaluations, special attention is given here to the ethics criterion. While 
efficacy and effectiveness can employ quantitative, standardized metrics, the ethical crite-
rion — in this case an innovative and integrative addition — requires a more qualitative ap-
proach.  
5.1 Green Defaults 
As described above, the attitude-behaviour gap describes how peoples’ intentions and ac-
tions are not always inconsistency when it comes to the environment. When asked, for ex-
ample, to hypothetically choose an electricity provider most people will name a green or 
environmentally friendly utility. However, actual green electricity consumption does not 
match reported intentions in countries (such as Germany) that facilitate choice of carrier 
(Pichert and Katsikopoulos, 2008). Numerous studies have shown that pre-set default options 
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have the power to promote environmentally conscious choices, including the selection of 
renewable electricity. 
5.1.1 Efficacy 
In the following, we focus on whether theories about the success of green defaults can be 
tested and validated in the context of methodological trials and experiments, namely effi-
cacy studies. Subsequently, we provide an assessment of cases in which scholars such as 
Toft, Schuitema and Thøgersen (2014) or Pichert and Katsikopoulos (2008) (amongst others) 
have evaluated green defaults as efficacious or inefficacious.  
In a series of experiments Toft et al. (2014) investigate whether defaults serve as strong 
policy tools to nudge people towards environmental ends. Consumers were also confronted 
with green defaults promoting smart grid technology, which is a technological prerequisite 
for the energy transition to renewables (Toft et al., 2014, pp. 119–121).  The sample included 
Danish, Norwegian and Swiss electricity consumers. The framing of the question was manip-
ulated: either as opt-in (“Tick the box below if you accept installation”), opt-out (“Tick the 
box below if you do not accept installation”) or a neutral active choice for one alternative 
or the other (Toft et al., 2014, p. 11). The aim of the analysis was not only to test the 
efficacy of the default in steering choices, but also to identify the type of default that max-
imises people’s willingness to adopt smart grid technology. The theoretical basis of this 
paper consists of the theory of nudging in regard to relevant environmental choice situations 
as well as the importance of cognitive biases when it comes to two types of instruments: 
information and default settings as part of nudging (Toft et al., 2014, pp. 4-5). The argu-
mentation is that default nudges can be considered as one of the most powerful types of 
nudges for environmental purposes (Toft et al., p. 121). These theoretical assumptions rely 
mainly on research into peoples’ processing limitations and cognitive biases. In many cases 
individuals assume that a default setting signifies the better and safer option. In other cases, 
people’s laziness plays a large role.  
As a reliable method, online surveys were conducted with the aim to test consumer behav-
iour in a constructed, laboratory setting. More specifically, the study used a “3 (types of 
benefits mentioned) x 2 (personal control mentioned or not) x 3 (framings) between-subjects 
design with random allocation to groups […] to test the effects of different framings of the 
choice task while controlling for outcome and control information about smart grid technol-
ogy” (p. 129). Participants were asked to first read a text about smart grid and later answer 
related questions. Here the default option was manipulated. This testing method shows high 
internal validity and strong evidence for the importance of default formulation. We assume 
that due to the random assignment of participants to control groups, the independent vari-
able caused the observed outcome. The results of the online surveys in all three countries 
show that defaults framed as opt-outs lead to a significantly higher acceptance among par-
ticipants, confirming the theoretical background that a strong default effect exists for envi-
ronmental behaviour (Toft et al., 2014, p. 136). This leads to the conclusion that opt-out 
framing is a significantly effective way of nudging people in an ecological direction (Ölander 
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& Thøgersen, 2014, p. 349). Moreover, results show consistency with formerly conducted 
behavioural economic studies. For policymakers, this might be an informative result since 
default nudges cannot only be used by private energy companies but also on a public policy 
level. Replication of this hypothetical lab experiment was conducted under real-world con-
ditions, namely in two field experiments in order to guarantee external and general validity. 
As we will describe thoroughly in the next Section 5.1.2, both studies also support the gen-
eral hypothesis. 
Another energy case in which the efficacy of a green default was tested is the choice be-
tween green and conventional electricity, evaluated by Pichert and Katsikopoulos (2008). 
The theoretical basis of this paper consists of psychological environmental studies that 
clearly suggest an attitude-behaviour gap on the part of the consumers when it comes to 
green energy consumption. Studies show that consumers are willing to pay a higher price for 
green energy but do not put this willingness into practice. Interesting for environmental 
policymakers is the assumption that people stick to defaults when trade-offs between saving 
money and environmental protection are made (Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 2008, p. 65). This 
is typically the situation when electricity consumers are confronted with the choice between 
a renewable or conventional electricity contract. Additionally, Pichert and Katsikopoulos 
(2008) conclude that due to further investigation regarding defaults, it becomes evident that 
people rarely switch the default options and choose the alternative. This might be because 
they have little knowledge about the product or programme or because they simply assume 
that the authorities who established the programme know better. As outlined in Section 2, 
these reactions are often due to cognitive biases (Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 2008, p. 65). 
Acting on the assumption that defaults play an essential role when decisions about money 
and the environment are being made, Pichert and Katsikopoulos (2008) sought to prove their 
hypothesis that “defaults affect the choice of electricity” (p. 65) in two laboratory experi-
ments as well as in two natural experiments. 
In our case, as a reliable method, only the first of the two laboratory experiments is rele-
vant. Pichert and Katsikopoulos (2008) asked young adults to fill in a survey in which they 
had to imagine they were moving to a new city and thus obligated to choose a new electricity 
contract — between green and ‘grey’ (conventional energy). The information given to the 
participants involved a manipulation check to test whether participants understood that grey 
energy is significantly less environmentally friendly than green energy (Pichert & Katsikopou-
los, 2008, p. 67). In total 225 individuals participated (63% students), each randomly assigned 
to one of three different experimental conditions — opt-out (green default), opt-in (grey 
default) and neutral (active choice). A power analysis was conducted in order to make sure 
that results of the selected sample would show at least 0.80 (reasonable level of statistical 
accuracy) “for a medium effect size at a significance level of 0.05” (Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 
2008, p. 67). The lab experiment showed interesting results. For example, anticipated effort 
or laziness prevented many participants from choosing the non-default option. Often, dis-
trust regarding the non-default option was visible and more information on the non-default 
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option was requested than on the default option. Only two per cent criticised the default as 
such. Thus, Pichert and Katsikopoulos’s (2008) hypothesis that the default setting would 
influence respondents’ choices was confirmed: The green energy alternative was chosen 
significantly more often when it was set as a default option (p. 68). Motivated by the fact 
that there is a significant gap between peoples’ desire to use green energy and the percent-
age of customers that actually have a green energy contract, Pichert and Katsikopoulos 
(2008) confirmed their hypothesis using both laboratory and natural experiments. The rep-
lication of tests under real-world conditions as well as in the laboratory suggests high exter-
nal validity.  
So far, our evaluation can confirm strong internal validity for green defaults in the realm of 
environmentally friendly energy and the usage of smart grids, based on two extensive effi-
cacy trials with similar positive outcomes. These examples, however, are not the only ex-
amples backing up the suitability of green nudges as an efficacious type of policy instrument. 
A different series of experiments, for example, evaluated the efficacy for default settings 
in regard to energy efficiency, particularly the use of energy-efficient light bulbs. In three 
experiments, Dinner, Johnson, Goldstein and Liu (2011) measured the impact of effort, im-
plied endorsement and reference dependence on choice, adding an interesting new dimen-
sion to the discussion, namely the hypothesis that “defaults may act as instant endowments” 
(pp. 5-6). Identical to the studies described above, the experiment showed that green de-
faults mattered greatly and further supported prior experiments that had highlighted these 
three variables as responsible for the success of defaults (p. 2).  
In reviewing the literature on the efficacy of green nudges, this research finds that defaults, 
as one type of green nudge, can be generally considered as efficacious. A common conclusion 
by all three groups of authors, who based their assumptions on sound psychological theories, 
is that default effects are particularly strong in a laboratory setting. Based on our literature 
review, green defaults show strong internal validity in many environmental realms. More 
effort, however, needs to be put into replication. Conducting a study several times within a 
laboratory setting, with different subject populations, adds external validity and indicates 
the generalisability of a phenomenon.  
Nevertheless, an evaluation of the efficacy of a policy instrument or a type of policy is not 
enough. As previously mentioned, when testing consumer behaviour, researchers often high-
light the attitude-behaviour gap — consumers’ attitudes towards environmental ends may 
be positive but do not translate into action under real-world conditions. The next step is to 
test the effectiveness of a policy instrument under such conditions, paying close attention 
to the implications of the nudge in practice. 
5.1.2 Effectiveness 
Ölander and Thøgersen (2014) summarise the findings of the smart grid study, originally 
conducted by Toft et al. (2014) and introduced in the previous section. The authors draw 
the conclusion that defaults are a powerful tool to foster pro-environmental behaviour in 
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the form of green energy consumption. However, if we have a closer look at the details of 
the study and apply our effectiveness criteria, we find that one should consider a few addi-
tional aspects before applying defaults in environmental policies. First, it is worth mention-
ing a detail that Ölander and Thøgersen (2014) leave out in their evaluation of the study: It 
was not only conducted in a hypothetical way using online surveys about a potential instal-
lation of the technology, but also a field experiment was carried out in Denmark. Thus, not 
only the efficacy of defaults was tested, but also the effectiveness under real-world condi-
tions (Toft et al., 2014, p. 115). This is important for our evaluation, since we established 
efficacy trials to be a prerequisite for any test of effectiveness.  
Our criterion practicability is addressed by the fact that a field experiment was performed 
additionally to the hypothetical study in Denmark (as well as in Norway and Switzerland). 
The question is, though, whether practicability is not only addressed, but also sufficient to 
call defaults an effective type of green nudge. It could be argued that the study is practically 
relevant since the electricity company’s query could be considered a real-world scenario. 
However, it is difficult for us to draw conclusions about the external validity of the study 
when so little information is given about the sample group. With no proven external validity, 
a green nudge cannot be called practicable, since it remains only valid in the hypothetical 
sphere.  
The sample group in this particular study can be summarised as 140 Danish electricity con-
sumers provided by a company that had conducted business with them in the past. However, 
Toft et al. (2014) point out that they received no socio-demographic data about the consum-
ers (p. 119). This is a critical detail when we want to assess generalisability: If no data other 
than the addresses of the consumers are available, it is not possible to evaluate whether 
they represent the broader (Danish) population. Moreover, the number of participating per-
sons may be too low to generalise the results. Although the authors claim the opposite with 
their remark that all three hypothetically tested countries showed similar results regarding 
the effectiveness of defaults, this holds only true for the efficacy of the default, but is not 
automatically proven in the real world (Toft et al., 2014, p. 120). If we not only take gener-
alisability of the sample group into account, but also the setting and implementation of the 
study, we can conclude that the authors do not prove effectiveness of defaults for settings 
other than Danish households (as for example for workplaces) and neither do they mention 
any replications of the study in which other skilled staff than the policy developers replicate 
the same results proving effectiveness. 
Two other important criteria for effectiveness, longevity and side effects, are hard to eval-
uate on the basis of the given information about the effectiveness trial by Toft et al. (2014). 
We can only hypothetically evaluate these aspects of the effectiveness of green defaults in 
this case: Replications of the study would be required to test the default’s longevity. Since 
both green nudges and smart grid technology are young inventions, we need to leave the 
question of long-term effects to be answered in the future. The same is true for side effects: 
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Too little information is given to assess whether a green nudge in the form of a default has 
side effects. 
Lastly, the question needs to be answered whether the green default tested, leads to the 
desired outcome and if its impact is relevant enough to deserve the effectiveness label. 
Evaluating the outcome of the study, it can be concluded that the desired outcome, i.e., a 
higher acceptance of smart grid technology adoption through the use of a default nudge was 
achieved. The results are statistically significant, suggesting that green policies could be 
successfully promoted if policymakers made people actively choose to out-opt of a default 
that is considered beneficial for the environment. In order to be able to evaluate the impact 
of the default better, it would be useful to have comparison studies arranged to shed light 
on the degree of effectiveness of green defaults compared to other environmental policy 
tools. 
In the previous evaluation of the efficacy of defaults, this paper presented the case of green 
energy defaults. Pichert and Katsikopoulos (2008) emphasise that it is not easy to find real-
world examples in which customers are offered green energy as a default. However, they 
were successful in providing instances of it in Southern Germany. It is important to note that 
strictly viewed, these natural experiments are not true experiments, but observations, since 
the researchers could not ensure an experimental control (Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 2008, 
pp. 65-69).  
The first observation dealt with the town Schönau, Germany in which green electricity has 
been the default since a citizen initiative bought the local electricity grid and took over the 
management after the Chernobyl disaster in 1986, relying entirely on renewable energy. 
Interestingly, the town has not historically shown a high approval of the German Green Party, 
and its inhabitants tend to be more conservative. However, despite the contentiousness of 
the initial decision to overtake the incumbent utility, almost all the citizens (roughly 99%) 
stuck with the green energy default, even after the liberalisation of the electricity market 
in Germany in 1998. At this point people would have been able to switch back to cheaper 
grey energy (Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 2008, p. 66). In a second natural example of the ef-
fectiveness of green defaults, Pichert and Katsikopoulos (2008) describe the German energy 
company Energiedienst GmbH, which in 1999 broadened their energy offers, among other 
things with a green tariff. Energiedienst GmbH made the green energy option the default 
and it was even cheaper than the previous standard tariff. Besides the green default, the 
company offered an even cheaper grey option as well as a more expensive green alternative 
(financing newer facilities). Similar to the Schönau example, circa 94% of the customers kept 
the green default (Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 2008, p. 66). 
To sum up, in these two cases, green energy defaults seemed to be highly effective because 
nearly all customers remained with the default choice. But what can we conclude when we 
use our effectiveness criteria with these examples? First, the practicability of these results 
is relatively high. Although the natural experiments are flawed from an empirical perspec-
tive since there is no experimental control (Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 2008, p. 66), they are 
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arguably very valuable for policymakers since they are proper real-world cases in which 
people were successfully nudged to make pro-environmental choices. Furthermore, the En-
ergiedienst GmbH case provides evidence of 150,000 households of which 94% stayed with 
the green default, which not only gives practical support for default effectiveness, but also 
makes it generalisable due to the sample size. 
The Schönau case, however, might be harder to prove regarding generalisability, since the 
sample size is relatively small (2,500 inhabitants) and “the unemployment rate is relatively 
low” (Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 2008, p. 66). Thus, the case of the small idyllic Southern 
German town might be difficult to generalise to a rather heterogeneous larger city like Ber-
lin. As in the smart grid case, the setting is limited to private households and not general-
isable to other settings, but the implementation contrasts with the other case independent 
from the researcher or policy developer, which naturally happened through the non-experi-
mental/non-empirical setting of the German examples. 
Whereas possible side effects cannot be evaluated with the information provided (side ef-
fects are not mentioned in the study), the German cases serve as interesting ones with re-
spect to longevity. Especially Schönau provides effectiveness evidence: According to Pichert 
and Katsikopoulos (2008), the default was still highly effective after it had been set for eight 
years (1669 of 1683 electricity meters were still supplied with green energy in 2006). It would 
be interesting to see the numbers today, a decade later, but even with the data from 2006 
it can be assumed that the green default had a long-term effect. Needless to say after men-
tioning the percentage of customers that stick with the green default, the resulting outcome 
was in line with Pichert and Katsikopoulos’s (2008) intention, namely that using green energy 
as a default option leads to a significantly higher share of green energy among consumers. 
Similar to the smart grid cases, the impact should be evaluated in comparison to other en-
vironmental policy instruments and further case studies in order to draw a safe conclusion 
for the effectiveness evaluation. 
In conclusion, our preliminary evaluation of green default effectiveness suggests that Thaler 
and Sunstein’s ‘marketing’ of defaults as an effective nudge, shared by many scholars (Toft 
et al., 2014; Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 2008), can to a certain extent be confirmed by our 
evaluation criteria. As the cases in the field of green energy consumption show, green de-
faults seem to produce the desired outcomes and have proven, where data was available, 
to be effective in the long term. Moreover, they are effective with regard to their practica-
bility, as the selected examples have been tested both under real-world and laboratory con-
ditions. Extensive further evidence for the long-term effectiveness as well as the practica-
bility of green defaults can be drawn from the summary of relevant empirical studies found 
in the Annex to this report. However, more research is required in regards to side effects, 
impact and generalisability. This is mainly due to the fact that green defaults, like green 
nudges in general, are a relatively new subject of research.  





When examining whether a particular green default nudge infringes upon a person’s auton-
omy, and to what degree, we must scrutinise whether external forces distort that person’s 
ability to make decisions based on their own reasons and motives. In the literature, there 
are arguments for and against the infringement of autonomy by green default nudges. Smith, 
Goldstein and Johnson (2013) maintain that default nudges are superior to active choosing 
on autonomy grounds, arguing that it is an insult to an individual’s autonomy to force him 
or her to choose (p. 16). Further reasoning suggests that people who would like to choose, 
are not deprived of that choice by a default rule as they are free to reject the default. 
Sunstein (2013), on the other hand, has argued that green default nudges might well intrude 
on autonomy even though freedom of choice is preserved. For many green nudges, including 
default nudges, the causal mechanism through which choice architecture is intended to work 
“[…] deliberately seek[s] to by-pass the individual’s rational decision-making processes in 
order to channel behaviour in the direction preferred by the choice architect” (Yeung, 2012, 
p. 135). Default schemes from which individuals may opt out of easily and cheaply, seek to 
exploit status quo bias and inertia to nudge individuals into adopting the default preference. 
When examining green default nudges in this way, they entail a subtle form of manipulation 
by taking advantage of the human tendency to act unreflectively and, to that extent, are 
inconsistent with demonstrating respect for individual autonomy (Yeung, 2011, p. 136). De-
fault nudges purposefully seek to exploit the tendency of individuals to choose passively and 
unreflectively (Yeung, 2011, p. 137). 
Smith et al. (2013) believe that there is a good chance, due to the force of inertia, that 
people might not reject a harmful default (p. 161). If so, there is arguably an intrusion on a 
person’s autonomy, as they will end up with outcomes that they did not specifically select. 
Three basic psychological factors have been suggested to be causally responsible for the 
behavioural impact of defaults: inertia, loss aversion and implicit recommendations (Sun-
stein & Reisch, 2013, pp. 140-144; Smith et al., 2013; Schubert, 2016, p. 18). An extensive 
amount of literature claims that these three processes are all external forces: distorting a 
person’s ability to make decisions based on their own reasons and motives. We must, there-
fore, conclude that green default nudges infringe, at least to some degree, on a person’s 
autonomy. 
Manipulation and transparency 
Evaluating whether a green default nudge is manipulative, similar to evaluating its effect on 
autonomy, is a process not simplified by examining the literature. Thaler and Sunstein 
(2008), for instance, dismiss the notion that nudging is a manipulation of choices, by arguing 
that, because green default nudges work without limiting the original set of choices, citizens 
remain free to choose otherwise (p. 82 and p. 239). Others, such as Binder (2014), claim 
that since default rules work particularly well on people who do not reflect on the decision 
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to be made — and are thus not even aware that they are opting out — the nudge is manipu-
lative in nature (p. 1118). 
Recall our definition of manipulation: the attempt to influence people subconsciously, in a 
way that undermines their capacity for conscious choice. We identified a framework used 
by Hansen and Jespersen (2013) to outline the level of manipulation of various nudges. In 
this framework, all nudges are categorised as either transparent or non-transparent, as well 
as whether they are Type 1 or Type 2, i.e., similar to the passive/activating distinction in 
our typology (refer to Figure 2).11 We will be closely using Hansen and Jespersen’s (2013) 
framework to make our preliminary evaluation of the level of manipulation and transparency 
of green default nudges. 
Hansen and Jespersen (2013), interestingly categorise green default nudges as both trans-
parent and non-transparent Type 1 nudges. A green default nudge falling into the category 
of a transparent nudge could, for example, be setting the default printer option to double-
sided printing, as opposed to single-sided, to reduce paper consumption. Rutgers University 
adopted this double-sided printing default, resulting in a 44% reduction of paper consumed 
in the first three years (Sunstein & Reisch, 2013, p. 399). Green default nudges that fall 
under the category of transparent Type 1 nudges do not try to influence citizens’ choices. 
Rather, they involve influencing automatic behaviours and the consequences thereof in a 
transparent way. Hansen and Jespersen (2013) claim that this type of influence is difficult, 
if not impossible, to avoid as it activates instinctive responses (p. 24). Although, they con-
clude that these types of green default nudges do in fact manipulate, it is noted that this is 
in the sense of ‘technical’ manipulation, not psychological manipulation (Hansen & Jesper-
sen, 2013, p. 24).12 
Although citizens are technically free to ignore the default and choose to change their own 
preferences should they wish, this freedom is largely theoretical since exposure to a green 
default nudge will affect preference selection through automatic behaviour (see Annex for 
multiple examples). While the transparent element of this type of green nudge makes it 
possible for citizens to recognise the intention behind and means by which their behaviour 
                                            
 
11  As discussed in Section 3.3.1: While both categories of nudges aim at influencing auto-
matic modes of thinking, activating nudges aim at influencing the attention and premises 
of reflective thinking (i.e. choices), via influencing the automatic system. Passive nudges 
on the other hand, aim at influencing the behaviour maintained by automatic thinking, or 
consequences thereof without involving reflective thinking (Hansen & Jespersen, 2013, p. 
14). 
12  Hansen and Jespersen (2013) define technical manipulation as “the intentional manipu-
lation of a straightforward cause-and-effect relationship” (p. 19). Psychological manipu-
lation, on the other hand, is defined as “manipulation in the sense of intending to change 
the perception, choices or behaviour of others through underhanded deceptive, or even 
abusive tactics” (p. 18). They further argue that nudging usually only changes frequencies 
and thus the effect is probabilistic rather than deterministic (p. 19). 
FFU-Report 01-2017: Green Nudging 55 
 
 
is influenced, it does not easily allow them to avoid this. The use of nudges such as these 
should be generally regarded as acceptable; they allow citizens to easily dispute their influ-
ence within the democratic process, and assign proper responsibilities to public policymak-
ers. 
Non-transparent Type 1 nudges also include green default nudges. An example of a green 
nudge from this category is the opt-out rather than opt-in smart grid trial conducted by 
Ölander and Thøgersen (2014) and discussed in the previous section. The authors report on 
a study that examined consumers’ willingness to participate in a smart grid trial where their 
household’s consumption could be automatically reduced at peak electricity demand peri-
ods. The opt-in to the trial (choose to participate) rendered a 60% participation rate, 
whereas the opt-out option (choose not to participate) rendered a participation rate of al-
most 80% (Ölander & Thøgersen, 2014, p. 351). 
Green default nudges of this manner cause behavioural change without engaging the reflec-
tive system and in such a way that makes recognising the nudge extremely difficult. There-
fore, we conclude that nudges of this nature influence behaviour in a non-transparent way, 
and as such, their application constitutes the use of both technical and psychological ma-
nipulation. Citizens are in general only capable of avoiding their effects as a matter of prin-
ciple, avoiding it in a complex everyday setting seems much more difficult, if not impossible. 
Proportionality 
When examining green default nudges in regard to the principle of proportionality, we must 
evaluate whether this type of nudge passes the four-prong test. As mentioned in our evalu-
ative framework (Section 4.2.3), we assume the ends of all green nudges to be justified; 
therefore, we will not discuss the first prong of the proportionality evaluation any further. 
The literature on green nudges provides many examples of where green default nudges work, 
at least to some degree, and since this is all that is required to fulfil the second prong of 
suitability, green default nudges fulfil the second prong also.13 
Exploring the third prong is where we run into difficulty with our preliminary evaluation. To 
sufficiently answer whether green default nudges are or are not the only suitable measure 
to further the public interest, an in-depth evaluation would need to be done of all other 
possible measures. As we have neither the time, nor the available resources to conduct such 
an evaluation, we will conclude that since the likely alternative to default nudges is active 
choice, green default nudges are the most suitable measure. We conclude this on the basis 
that green default nudges have shown to further the public interest significantly more than 
active choices. One example of this can be seen in a pair of studies conducted by Pichert 
                                            
 
13  Refer to Ölander and Thøgersen (2014), Pichert and Katsikopoulos (2008), Thaler and Sun-
stein (2008). 
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and Katsikopoulos (2008) in which 94-99% of consumers stayed with the green electricity 
default rather than switching to a cheaper but fossil-based electricity supply. 
The final prong produces the largest problem for the current paper. This part of the prelim-
inary evaluation requires us to weigh the undesired effects, predominantly the ethical crit-
icisms discussed earlier, against the importance of the public interest the green default 
nudge is seeking to achieve. Green default nudges are always seeking to reduce negative 
environmental externalities, such as reducing the effects of climate change through small 
scale acts of mitigation or adaptation. Due to the tremendous importance climate change 
has, and will increase to have, on human security it is likely that there are few cases in 
which ethical criticisms would outweigh a green default nudge in theory. Of course, each 
individual green default nudge, prior to being implemented, would still need to be evaluated 
independently to determine the ethical implications of its use. 
5.2 Green Social Norms 
Most humans are strongly and regularly affected by social norms that guide their actions 
directly and indirectly in many meaningful ways. A normal propensity for most humans is to 
learn social norms, which can be understood as the standard behaviour and shared under-
standing of certain actions based on a common belief system. Recall that social norms can 
be categorised as descriptive, comparative or injunctive. Descriptive and comparative norms 
refer to neutral information about behaviour in society, whereas injunctive norms attach 
moral weight to certain forms of behaviour. 
As with littering, many social norms already define our behaviour towards environmental 
issues. However, global environmental problems, such as climate change, call for a funda-
mental and rapid change in social norms to guarantee lasting progress. On this basis, we 
investigate the role of social norm nudges in the context of environmental policy goals. 
5.2.1 Efficacy 
One of the chapters in Thaler and Sunstein’s Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, 
Wealth and Happiness deals extensively with social norms. In many ways, humans are highly 
influenced by the behaviour of other humans; sometimes to the extent that we do not need 
to have contact with other humans in order to stick to certain rules and norms. In such cases 
we are guided by social norms. In order to understand ‘following the herd’ behaviour we 
must revisit the difference between Econs and Humans: “Humans […] are frequently nudged 
by other Humans. Sometimes massive social changes, in markets and politics alike, start with 
a small social nudge” (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 64). Self-interested Econs are not swayed 
by the actions or beliefs of their peers. This sounds promising for environmental policymak-
ers, since the social aspect of certain nudges might help to effectively foster pro-environ-
mental behaviour. 
Ölander and Thøgersen (2014) state that the social character of humans certainly is a source 
of environmental problems, but that it could also serve as a solution. A study on energy 
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conservation through ‘product-integrated feedback’ by McCalley and Midden (2002), is a 
good example of the power of green social norms and their efficacy. In the following, we 
take a closer look at examples regarding social norms and again apply our efficacy criteria. 
The question is whether the scholarly consensus about the power of green social norm nudges 
can be confirmed from a laboratory point of view.    
Generally, theories on social norms are mainly based on why we follow norms and how we 
learn them. Particularly in the environmental realm, some differentiate between two dif-
ferent types of social norms: “social norms of conformity or cooperation and pro-environ-
ment social norms” (Kinzig et al., 2013, p. 170). As norms of conformity or cooperation are 
far more universal and do not interfere with other interests or values, they may be more 
suitable for reaching environmental goals. 
Many efficacy studies have been conducted in regard to social norms and alcohol consump-
tion. Employing RCTs, Lewis and Neighbors (2006) found that personalised feedback could 
help reduce units of alcohol consumed per average occasion. Due to a lack of laboratory 
studies on the efficacy of social norms, however, we were forced to limit our analysis to one 
paper. McCalley and Midden (2002) evaluated the effectiveness of feedback intervention and 
commitments in a laboratory setting, asking participants about their energy conservation 
behaviour. 
The theoretical basis of this paper is very extensive and is mainly comprised of psychological 
studies (including former efficacy studies) about the relationship between feedback and 
goals, particularly ‘feedback intervention theory’ (McCalley & Midden, 2002, p. 594). Based 
on these studies, the authors assume that goal-setting is needed as a reference in order to 
understand the effects of feedback. Following this logic, if a task is comprised of goal-setting 
and goal acceptance, feedback effects should be automatically improved (McCalley & Mid-
den, 2002, p. 594). The study itself focuses on “[…] the integration of feedback into a system 
designed for a single task [one household appliance]” (McCalley & Midden, 2002, p. 593). 
The reliable method of the study consisted of a computerised task, representing ten washing 
machine trials within a graphic representation. Participants included one hundred residents 
from the Dutch city of Eindhoven who fulfilled the criterion of washing once a week. First, 
they received questions concerning demographic data and participated in a game in order 
to test social orientation. In the following sessions, four feedback groups were used in order 
to test “(1) feedback with no-goal manipulation, (2) feedback with a self-set goal, and (3) 
feedback with an experimenter assigned goal [as well as] a fourth group […] tested under a 
no-feedback-no-goal condition and served as the baseline control” (McCalley & Midden, 
2002, pp. 595-596). Hypotheses were tested with a 3x2 GLM factorial design (McCalley & 
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Midden, 2002, p. 598).14 Interestingly, evaluations of the trial revealed that feedback is 
clearly related to goal-setting. Both groups, self-set and assigned, significantly reduced their 
energy consumption (21.9% and 19.5%) (McCalley & Midden, 2002, p. 599). 
This single study supports the efficacy and internal validity of green social norms, specifically 
commitment or goal-setting, based on one example in the environmental realm. Moreover, 
the study is a replication of a formerly conducted study by Becker (1978) and therefore 
equally serves to support the generalisability of the outcome. Notably, the majority of social 
norm experiments (particularly those relevant to the environment) are field studies and thus 
covered in the following section.  
5.2.2 Effectiveness 
There is ample evidence to back up Thaler and Sunstein’s (2008) claim about the high level 
of effectiveness of social norms nudges. For instance, van der Heijden and Kosters (2015) as 
well as Cialdini et al. (1990) mention the remarkable effect of normative values with respect 
to public littering. Furthermore, Cialdini et al. (2006) examine the problem of theft of pet-
rified wood in a national park in Arizona, which was to a great extent solved by the use of a 
green social norm nudge. However, as stated above, the most discussed cases in which the 
effectiveness of green social norm nudges has been evaluated are: reusing towels in hotels 
because other guests do so (Cialdini, 2005; Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Goldstein, Cialdini & 
Griskevicius, 2008; Schultz, Khazian & Zaleski, 2008) or saving energy at home because 
neighbours do (Graffeo et al., 2015; Schultz et al., 2007; Costa & Kahn, 2010; Allcott, 2011; 
Ölander & Thøgersen, 2014). 
As mentioned above, the idea to nudge hotel guests to reuse their towels as an energy saving 
measure has been discussed extensively in the literature. Goldstein et al. (2008), for one, 
conclude that the most effective way to make people reuse their towels is not by appealing 
to people’s moral drive to help save the environment, but instead with a social norm that 
states, “the majority of guests in this room reuse their towels” (p. 1). In their first field 
experiment, Goldstein et al. (2008) compared the effects of signs in hotel rooms that use 
environmental protection messaging with signs that employ green social norms (stating that 
most other guests reuse their towels). The result confirmed their hypothesis — the green 
social norm was significantly more successful in promoting conservation behaviour. If we 
evaluate this experiment on the basis of our effectiveness criteria, can we conclude that 
green social norms play an essential role in effectively changing people’s behaviour? 
With respect to practicability, it is worth mentioning that Goldstein et al. (2008) did not 
inform the hotel guests about their participation in the experiment. Thus, the conditions 
can be considered useful to test practicability. Since the effect of social norms is tested in 
                                            
 
14  General Linear Design (GLM) can be seen as an extension of multiple regression (for a 
discussion see Cnaan, Laird & Slasor, 1997, pp. 2349–2351).  
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contrast to the environmental protection condition, which is the conventional attempt in 
hotels to save energy, we have a control group that the social norm nudge can be tested 
against (Goldstein et al., 2008, p. 2). At least in our preliminary evaluation, the criterion 
practicability seems to be addressed. Related to practicability is generalisability, because 
effectiveness as defined by relevance in the real world is closely connected to whether the 
green nudge can be applied to broader conditions.  
Regarding the generalisability to a broader population, it can be summarised that the study 
was conducted with about 1000 instances of towel (re)use in a hotel of medium size and 
medium price in the US. This could be regarded as a suitable setting to generalise the results. 
However, the setting might be more difficult to apply to other environments, as the stay in 
a hotel, at least for the average person, cannot be generalised as an everyday experience. 
Admittedly, it does not make sense to test this particular nudge in households, as people 
normally reuse their towels multiple times anyway. Still, one could extend the study in a 
similar way in a public setting by slightly changing the set-up. For instance, it could be tested 
whether norm-based, comparable messages work in schools. The amount of paper towels 
could probably be reduced if a sign said that other students only use one per time. Imple-
mentation apparently does not depend on the policy developers, as the nudge can be easily 
operated by anyone (see Goldstein et al., 2008, p. 3 for a description of how the hotel staff 
were trained).  
Whereas the evaluation of practicability and generalisability is a relatively straightforward 
procedure due to the provided data about the sample group and other conditions of the 
effectiveness test, it is more difficult to assess longevity and side effects. Whether green 
social norms in terms of towel usage in hotels are effective on a long-term basis would be 
an interesting but challenging focus of further research. What the study by Goldstein et al. 
(2008) does not address is whether the towel nudge remains effective when hotel guests are 
confronted with it multiple times during further hotel visits. Therefore, longevity would have 
to be considered to draw valid conclusions about the effectiveness of green social norms. 
The same is true for side effects: The fact that Goldstein et al. (2008) do not address any 
does not mean that they do not exist. 
To conclude our evaluation criteria, some thoughts follow about the questions of outcome 
and impact. The outcome could certainly be evaluated as a success. The researchers’ inten-
tion was to save energy through a reduction of new towel usage in a hotel, which is reflected 
in the result of the test: Compared to about 35% of guests reusing their towels when a sign 
is placed that asks for environmental protection, roughly 44% do so when the social compar-
ison is activated in their mind (Goldstein et al., 2008, p. 3). Little information is given with 
respect to the impact of the nudge other than an implicit connection between water con-
servation and towel reuse, and regardless further replications of the experiment are needed 
to determine the environmental effect this green social norm. However, as mentioned be-
fore, the nudge’s practicability in a real-world situation suggests that social norms are the-
oretically effective in terms of impact. 
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Inspired by the success of social norms marketing, Schultz et al. (2007) conducted field re-
search on green social norms and energy conservation with the intention of applying these 
marketing strategies to the environmental field. Since they specifically address the fact that 
green social norm can lead to so-called boomerang effects (i.e. undesired negative side ef-
fects, see Schultz et al., 2007, p. 429), this study is particularly interesting for our purposes. 
In summarising the experiment, which we already briefly touched on in the Introduction and 
Section 3.3 of this paper, it should be mentioned that Schultz et al. (2007) tested the effect 
of letters sent to 290 households in California. In one of the sample groups, the message 
contained information about the households’ energy consumption in the previous week and 
the average energy consumption of the neighbours. In the other group, a happy or sad smiley 
was added, dependent on whether the household had comparatively high or low energy use 
(Schultz et al., 2007, pp. 430-431). The findings confirm Schultz et al.’s (2007) hypothesis 
that energy consumption can be significantly decreased with help of green social norm 
nudges (pp. 431-432). 
Our evaluation of the energy nudge’s effectiveness starts with its practicability. Contrary to 
the towel experiment, the participants were aware of their participation in the study. Argu-
ably, this could have had an impact on their behaviour via demand characteristics such as 
the social desirability effect, as they might want to perform well when being observed in 
their energy use. The aspect of the division of sample groups in two, receiving a message 
with or without a smiley, could have been added as another element to improve the overall 
practicability of the study: another sample group that receives a letter only with information 
on energy consumption and consequences for the environment (similar as in the towel case), 
so that the effect of social norms can be compared.  
The generalisability of the results could be improved upon as well. In order to have a higher 
validity about the effectiveness of social norms, more participants as well as information 
about socio-demographic data would have been helpful. If the sample only consists of well-
educated people, this can clearly have an impact on their responsiveness to the letter and 
it would harder to generalise the findings. Furthermore, the study could be extended to 
different settings than households, for example testing the effects of the nudge in state 
institutions in which the manager does not, to the same extent as a private household, ben-
efit from the money saved through less energy consumption. 
A much more positive conclusion can be drawn from the testing of longevity. Schultz et al. 
(2007) address short- and long-term changes. Short-term changes resulting from the letters 
sent to households could clearly be observed: Households that had higher energy consump-
tion than the average neighbour significantly reduced it and energy consumers below the 
average did not increase energy use when the smiley was added to the descriptive normative 
message (for a overview of effect sizes, see Annex). Long-term effects are almost identical 
in their outcome (Schultz et al., 2007, pp. 431-432). This could be an important and assuring 
factor for environmental policymakers if there was not one noteworthy detail: The authors 
only continued the study for four more weeks (p. 433). 
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As to possible side effects of the evaluated social norm nudge we have already touched upon 
the fact that the smiley added to the descriptive normative message plays an essential role 
to avoid the increase of energy consumption in households consuming less energy than the 
average neighbour (Schultz et al., 2007, p. 432). Thus, it needs to be mentioned that there 
would certainly be side effects if the researchers had not added the injunctive message with 
the smiley as an extra inductive social norm nudge. The creation of two sample groups that 
only differ in the smiley aspect can be considered very useful and novel. Hence, we conclude 
that side effects are well addressed in the effectiveness trial.  
To finish our effectiveness evaluation of the presented nudge, we propose a brief assessment 
of its outcome and impact. Generally, the outcome can be evaluated positively. In each 
case, the researchers were able to show that social norms can indeed be an adequate tool 
to improve the environment by saving energy or reducing towel usage. The predicted boom-
erang effect that occurred when people realised they were using comparatively little energy 
could be counteracted successfully with the addition of an injunctive social norm nudge. 
The impact of the injunctive message is remarkable and adds a valuable new dimension to 
the effectiveness of social norm nudges. 
The energy conservation intervention described above has been pilot-tested at scale in Cal-
ifornia by a company called OPOWER. The company has partnered with utilities in order to 
mail the social norm energy reports to thousands of homes across the United States (US). 
The OPOWER initiative has been shown to reduce monthly energy consumption by two per 
cent below a baseline (Allcott, 2011).15 If scaled nationally in the US, the green social norm 
intervention described above alone would decrease carbon dioxide emissions from the elec-
tricity sector by one per cent, avoiding 12.7 million metric tonnes of emissions (Allcott & 
Mullainathan, 2010, p. 1205). Thus, green social norms are already at the pilot-testing stage 
in terms of effectiveness, suggesting scalable and significant results. 
Overall, it can be concluded that social norm nudges have, with the exception of a few 
weaknesses in single sub-criteria, which we have just addressed, a relatively high potential 
to be considered effective environmental policy tools. The flaws that were identified can to 
a great extent be explained by the fact that the two nudges evaluated are relatively new 
and therefore need further longitudinal research dedicated to longevity and impact. This is 
similar to our conclusion about the effectiveness of defaults. A summary of further empirical 
evidence for effective social norm nudges has been incorporated in the Annex to this report.  
                                            
 
15  The study in question conducted a field experiment involving a sample of 80,000 house-
holds in Minnesota that were randomly assigned into control and treatment groups. 




Examining whether green social norm nudges infringe upon a person’s autonomy, and again 
to what degree, requires the scrutiny of external influences and whether these distort a 
person’s ability to make decisions based on personal reasons and motives. Schubert (2016) 
explains that one can “[…] communicate social norms about approved or disapproved 
choices, thereby harnessing people’s desire to conform to social expectations, to draw 
‘moral utility’ from that fact […], and to engage in conditional cooperation […]; this can be 
achieved by offering peer comparisons […]” (p. 11). 
Although Hacker (2016) makes a convincing argument in which he states that because both 
the content of the information and the behavioural tool is obvious and transparent, the 
autonomy of citizens is respected (p. 20). Others, such as Nolan et al. (2008), argue that 
because the awareness of what other people do has such a powerful influence on people’s 
behaviour, a social norm nudge cannot be classified so easily as such (p. 921). The insight 
that human beings are inherently social animals may in fact be behavioural economics’ key 
contribution to the social sciences (Gowdy, 2008, p. 642).  
There are a variety of ways to harness this basic human characteristic in the interest of 
promoting green behaviour. Eco-labels, for example, are a key instrument in providing con-
sumers with information about product characteristics, deemed by some essential for envi-
ronmentally responsible behaviour. Impacting behaviour by increasing the salience of certain 
product characteristics, therefore, making consumers more aware of them. Félonneau and 
Becker (2008) argue that eco-labelling also serves to confer a certain social value on these 
characteristics, at least insofar as pro-environmental behaviour is in fact socially approved 
in the given socio-cultural context (pp. 33-35). Of course, eco-labels can also be used to 
convey social norms, thereby activating herd behaviour. This can also be said about providing 
energy users with simple feedback regarding their current energy consumption, such as with 
smart meters (Carroll, Lyons & Denny, 2014; Joachain & Klopfert, 2014). 
One of the most successful applications of green nudges to reduce littering is the ‘Don’t 
mess with Texas’ social advertising campaign, initiated in 1986 (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 
64). It is estimated that this campaign reduced littering on Texas highways by about 71% 
between 1986 and 1990 (Mols, Haslam, Jetten & Steffens, 2015, p. 93). The slogan appears 
to target people’s sense of community pride, framing littering as a kind of behaviour Texans 
find unacceptable (see also Grasmick, Bursik & Kinsey, 1991). Mols et al. (2015) argue that 
the effectiveness and sustainability of this particular nudge are largely due to its impact on 
people’s self-understanding or social identity, making people internalise a specific social 
norm. 
Nagatsu (2015), discussing the ‘Don’t Mess With Texas' campaign, claims that the objection 
based on infringed autonomy does not carry any weight against social nudges that exploit 
FFU-Report 01-2017: Green Nudging 63 
 
 
these mechanisms (p. 488). The foundation for Nagatsu’s (2015) argument lies in the differ-
entiation between practical and theoretical reasoning, whereby social norm engineering op-
erates through practical reasoning and is thus unproblematic (p. 9).16 Further emphasising 
that since social norm engineering operates through practical reasoning, autonomy is not 
infringed. Another account of green social norm nudges refers to the frame-based mecha-
nism. Social nudges may induce people to shift from I-frame to we-frame in social dilemmas, 
thereby increasing pro-social, group-oriented behaviour. The key question, when considering 
whether autonomy is infringed upon, is whether a frame-shift is responsive to practical rea-
soning. If it is not, nudging people to adopt one frame rather than another does not appear 
to respect their autonomy. 
We would, based on the literature, have to conclude that green social norm nudges that 
impact people’s social identity, such as eco-labelling or the ‘Don’t Mess With Texas’ cam-
paign, do not infringe upon people’s autonomy. We would, however, have to agree with 
Nagatsu (2015), that a frame-shift increasing group-oriented behaviour does not respect au-
tonomy and is therefore not considered ethical under the criteria of autonomy employed by 
this framework. 
Manipulation and transparency 
For the evaluation of the level of manipulation and transparency of green social norm 
nudges, we will again use the framework established by Hansen and Jespersen (2013) as 
described in the evaluative framework. Green social norm nudges differ from green default 
nudges significantly here, as these are categorised in our typology as activating (Type 2) 
nudges. Although both nudging types aim at influencing automatic modes of thinking, Type 
2 nudges are aimed at influencing the attention and premise of — and hence the behaviour 
anchored in — reflective thinking (i.e. choice) (Hansen & Jespersen, 2013, p. 14). These 
nudges are influencing behaviours best characterised as actions, the results of deliberation, 
judgement, and choice. Green social norm nudges are further categorised as transparent 
nudges. 
A transparent activating nudge “[…] engages the reflective system in a way that makes it 
easy for the citizen to reconstruct the intentions and means by which behaviour change is 
pursued” (Hansen & Jespersen, 2013, p. 20). An example of a green social norm nudge is the 
use of social salience. This could be, for instance, the use of eco-labels, which convey social 
norms, thereby activating herd behaviour. Another example that falls into this category is 
the elicitation of descriptive norms with a clear messenger, for instance, a pamphlet showing 
                                            
 
16  Practical reasoning, in contrast to theoretical reasoning, refers to a process whereby rea-
son is used to arrive at a given decision. Interestingly, Ngatsu (2015) does not consider 
whether an action was conscious or unconscious as a relevant criterion for whether that 
action was delivered through practical reasoning or not: Everyday choices — frequently 
made unconsciously — are still considered to be authored by us (Nagatsu, 2015, p. 9). 
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the energy consumption compared to that of neighbours, or the ‘Don’t Mess With Texas’ 
campaign, discussed in the previous section. 
Hansen and Jespersen (2013) conclude that although it may be obvious that this type of 
nudge influences behaviour anchored in reflective thinking, they are not aimed at doing so 
by means of psychological manipulation.17 Green social norm nudges of this type aim at 
promoting decision making in ways that are transparent to the agents influenced. They gen-
erally work by prompting choices consistent with the reflected preferences of citizens by 
making features, actions, preferences, and/or consequences salient, or by providing feed-
back (Hansen & Jespersen, 2013, p. 24). These types of nudges “[…] actually allow citizens 
to be nudged, to change their actions and behaviour in a predictable way, while simultane-
ously leaving them free to choose otherwise — not just as a matter of principle, but also in 
practice” (Hansen & Jespersen, 2013, p. 24). 
Proportionality 
Evaluating green social norm nudges in regard to the principle of proportionality requires 
assessing whether the guidelines of the four-prong test is met. In this paper we assume, due 
to reasons laid out in Section 3.4, that the ends of green nudges (i.e. protecting and uphold-
ing environmental integrity) are justified. Additionally, there are plenty of examples de-
scribed in the literature where green social norm nudges work, at least to some degree.18 
Since this is all that is required to fulfil the second prong, we conclude that green social 
norm nudges fulfil the second criteria as well. We can move on quite quickly to the third 
(necessity of measure) and fourth (weighing of effects) prongs of the principle of propor-
tionality. 
Exploring the third prong (whether it is necessary) is difficult to address adequately within 
the scope of this paper. To sufficiently answer whether green social norm nudges are or are 
not the only suitable measure to further the public interest, an in-depth evaluation of all 
possible measures would need to be conducted. We would like to, however, draw a conclu-
sion based on the extensive literature we have reviewed. Based on the conclusion that green 
social norm nudges are both transparent and non-manipulative, we further conclude that 
nudges of this kind are the least restrictive intervention and, therefore, pass the third prong 
of the principle of proportionality test.  
The last prong of the proportionality test requires us to weigh the undesired effects against 
the importance of the public interest. This, again, poses the largest problem for us. Regard-
ing the evaluation of green social norm nudges, the undesired effects are the ethical criti-
cisms discussed earlier, weighed against the public interest, in this case the preservation of 
                                            
 
17  See Section 3.3.1 
18  e.g. Kallbekken and Sælen (2012), Thaler and Sunstein (2008), Mols et al. (2015), Gold-
stein et al. (2008), see also the Annex 
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the environment. At the risk of being predictable, we must draw the same conclusion as in 
the previous evaluation of green social norms. Climate change and other global environmen-
tal problems will most likely negatively affect billions of people worldwide. Mitigation and 
adaptation actions, all the way down to the level of individual behaviour, are of a grave 
importance, and the involvement of citizens in policy implementation is crucial. In conclu-
sion, it seems probable that — similar to green defaults — there are few circumstances under 
which ethical criticisms prohibit the use of a green social norm nudge. Of course, each green 
social norm nudge, before implementation, would need to be evaluated on an individual 
basis — considering contextual considerations. 
6 Discussion 
With two preliminary evaluations, we demonstrate strong support for both the efficacy as 
well as effectiveness of green defaults and green social norms. These findings fall in line 
with the rather positive outlook in the literature on nudging in general and in specific envi-
ronmental contexts. However, we contend that the complicated ethical dimensions of green 
nudging call for a more integrative and comprehensive evaluation. Not surprisingly, re-
searchers that take a closer look at ethical questions regarding nudging often position them-
selves as more cautious and do not necessarily share the positive assumptions concerning 
the new policy tool. 
In terms of efficacy, existing applied laboratory research is based on an extensive theoretical 
foundation that includes dual process theory and the heuristics and biases approach to 
bounded rationality, both described at the beginning of this paper. Green defaults, for one, 
have undergone thorough laboratory experimentation but studies conducted in different en-
vironmental fields support the efficacy of both types of nudges. There seems to be wide-
spread acceptance in the literature that the methods used to test these and other nudges 
are reliable. Indeed, in most of the cases evaluated here, control trials, including randomi-
sation, were used to ensure internal validity in a laboratory setting.  
The criterion of efficacy seems to be sufficiently addressed for green defaults. Green social 
norms, however, lack reliable laboratory experimentation in the environmental realm. Re-
searchers such as Goldstein at al. (2008) who conduct field studies on social norms back up 
their hypotheses with references to laboratory trials, but these are often not environmen-
tally related. Another major limitation in terms of the efficacy of both nudges is replication. 
Particularly for defaults, a lack of replication and small sample sizes both weaken the gen-
eralisability of findings to different contexts. When it comes to social norms, replication has 
been pursued to a far greater extent in field settings, including a handful of scaled pilot 
trials. Indeed, given how conducive social norm manipulations are to field experimentation, 
the literature seems to skip laboratory examination altogether. In sum, our evaluation sug-
gests that research on social norms focuses much more on effectiveness trials, while default 
studies show a broader range of efficacy experiments and often use field experiments to 
bolster the external validity and generalisability of laboratory findings. 
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Efficacy does not guarantee effectiveness. Nevertheless, for both nudges most of our effec-
tiveness criteria were sufficiently addressed in real-world, field experiments. Especially the 
sub-criteria of practicability and outcome play a central role in the examined cases. Both 
nudges evaluated resulted in significant changes in observed behaviour and the conditions 
of the experiments reflected real-world scenarios to a considerable extent. Furthermore, 
when side effects were identified in one case, researchers addressed them using a counter-
acting measure to achieve the desired outcome (e.g. the boomerang effect in the energy 
comparison between neighbours in Schultz et al., 2007). 
However, our evaluation was not entirely positive. Notably, both nudge types show some 
weaknesses in terms of generalisability and studies tend to neglect longevity and impact. In 
terms of generalisability, it would be desirable to have more information and socio-demo-
graphic data about the sample. Longevity is not sufficiently addressed due to the fact that 
green nudges are a new phenomenon; there is not a longstanding research programme as-
sessing them in the field. Only one experiment in our evaluation attempted to get a (pre-
liminary) impression about longevity of effect for the (arguably unsatisfactory) duration of 
four weeks.19 Lastly, it is hard to draw conclusions regarding impact due to a lack of com-
parisons between the effectiveness of green nudges and the effectiveness of traditional en-
vironmental policy tools. 
Evaluating the ethical criteria in our framework required a heavy reliance on existing liter-
ature from an array of academic fields, e.g., among others, philosophy, law and political 
science. In many cases, we were unable to evaluate each criterion sufficiently enough to 
draw concrete conclusions. Even if autonomy, manipulation and transparency were straight-
forward, the conclusions drawn are nonetheless somewhat subjective. However, subjectivity 
is unavoidable in a normative evaluation of green nudging and is not always undesirable. For 
instance, how one weighs the various sub-criteria in terms of importance provides flexibility 
for policymakers to tailor the framework to specific circumstances and contexts. In our eval-
uation, we implicitly gave all sub-criteria equal weighting, but one could just as easily em-
phasise, e.g., the sub-criterion transparency to ensure the visibility of a nudge in society. 
The conclusions that can be drawn regarding the autonomy, manipulation and transparency 
of green default and green social norm nudges reflect the current state of debate. Evaluating 
the principle of proportionality, on the other hand, required us to draw pre-emptive conclu-
sions. This evaluation, combining ethical concerns with the principles of proportionality, is 
the first of its kind and provides policymakers with a unique framework encompassing both 
crucial ethical considerations whilst also considering the legal ramifications of a new policy 
instrument. Furthermore, the principle of proportionality assessment highlights the aspects 
of green nudges that are superior to alternative policy measures and weighs these against 
                                            
 
19  More recently, Allcott and Rogers (2014) have shown evidence for a durable effect of 
social norm nudges for energy conservation. 
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other ethical implications. The resulting insights help inform policymakers where and in 
which contexts green nudges may be socially acceptable. 
In Section 4.2.3, we mentioned that nudging has been heavily criticised on the basis that it 
can compromise citizens’ ability to form preferences. Bovens (2009) suggests that the co-
herence (or lack thereof) of the preference structure an individual ends up with after being 
nudged indicates her autonomy losses. As he puts it, with fragmented preferences, an agent 
risks being eventually unable to recognize herself in her own actions (pp. 212-214). For ex-
ample, we might eat sustainably when selecting a meal from a cafeteria that choice archi-
tects have designed to steer our behaviour only to revert to bad eating habits when selecting 
food and snacks in other choice architectures. The issue of fragmentation concerns the de-
velopment of moral character over time (Selinger & Whyte, 2011, p. 929). The critique of 
nudges here refers to the notion that if one is not challenged to learn to make good choices 
in most contexts, one will expect other members of society to take responsibility for their 
decisions and nudge them away from anything that is bad for them. This could lead to mor-
ally lazy, fragmented selves, who are quick to rely on others to ensure their own welfare 
(Selinger & Whyte, 2011, p. 929). 
The concept of the ‘fragmented self’ is problematic for the legitimacy of nudging because 
people who do not value personal responsibility may accept forms of government that are 
not accountable to citizens and in which most decisions about how to modify citizens’ be-
haviour are made behind closed doors without any public input, consent or engagement 
(Selinger & Whyte, 2011, p. 929). It is possible to imagine an ethical objection that would 
contend that some nudges do not allow people to build up their own capacities and might 
even undermine their incentives to do so (Bovens, 2009, pp. 212-214). The more we become 
familiarized with being nudged, the less we may be bothered by the incremental introduc-
tion of more controlling tactics.   
In addition to compromising citizens’ ability to form preferences, nudging has been heavily 
criticised for being unfair. Sunstein and Reisch (2013) claim that nudging often works best 
on the uninformed and uneducated members of society (pp. 400-401). Therefore, a central 
concern should be the risk that green nudge policies will allow a minority of well-informed 
citizens to free-ride on the efforts of an less-informed majority (Lehner, Mont & Heiskanen, 
2016, p. 175). This is particularly relevant when discussing nudges addressing common goods, 
such as climate protection. An example of this, for instance, is the green default nudge 
addressing electricity consumption. One may knowingly opt out of green energy to avoid 
being nudged, thus enjoying the climatic mitigation benefits provided by the majority using 
sustainable energy whilst not participating financially. As Goodwin (2012) and Lehner et al. 
(2016) point out, it is democratically worrying to use nudging to influence the behaviour of 
those not able to identify a nudge, while allowing those that are able to identify it (and thus 
avoid it) escape the costs while benefiting from the gains. 
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Finally, the fairness of green nudging is frequently discussed regarding the distributive im-
pacts of a given nudge.20 Shah, Mullainathan and Shafir (2012) reason that the poor face a 
relatively higher cognitive load than the rich: struggling with making ends meet on a regular 
basis consumes scarce cognitive resources (pp. 683-684). Therefore, on the one hand, the 
poor may benefit by being relieved from cognitive stress when it comes to passive nudges 
but may lose out by not being able to enjoy the benefits that activating nudges can provide. 
Additionally, lower income communities with a higher cognitive load may also be more sus-
ceptible to green nudges. Analogous reasoning applies to the potential redistributive impacts 
of different kinds of nudges. For instance, nudges aimed at System 1 may have a larger 
impact on intuitive thinking consumers, as compared to their more analytically thinking 
peers (Hagman, Andersson, Västfjäll & Tinghög, 2015, p. 443). Additionally, fairness is rele-
vant as a matter of perception as it is frequently argued that policy measures in general do 
not work unless they are perceived as fair (Gowdy, 2008, p. 642). This last point illustrates 
how ethical concerns are inevitably linked to the other two evaluative criteria in our frame-
work. Green nudges deemed dubious by a population may be actively avoided and thus less 
effective in promoting pro-environmental behaviour. 
7 Conclusion 
Should we nudge for the environment? The question posed at the onset of this report cannot 
be answered with a definite yes or no recommendation, and instead deserves a far more 
nuanced treatment. In this paper, we not only provided an overview and typology of green 
nudging as a new policy instrument but went a step further by developing an evaluative 
framework specifically designed for green nudges. Putting this framework to work, we con-
ducted a preliminary assessment of two common nudges: green defaults and green social 
norms.  
Policymakers have different tools at their disposal — economic, regulatory and informational 
— to entice, coerce and promote environmentally friendly behaviour. However, the histori-
cal neglect of behavioural economics, nudge theory and bounded rationality in environmen-
tal policymaking has led to suboptimal results in many cases. Overwhelming evidence from 
the behavioural sciences suggests that ‘Humans’ by nature fall short of the rational choice, 
homo economicus ideal. The logical conclusion is therefore: Environmental policy must be 
tailored to account for limitations in human cognition and the impact of choice context. 
Green nudging represents a step in this direction. The results of our preliminary assessment 
of the efficacy and effectiveness of green nudging can be summarised in the first key con-
clusion of this report. 
                                            
 
20  i.e., the extent to which green nudges redistribute either well-being or freedom among 
heterogeneous populations. 
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(1) Green nudging is an effective tool for promoting pro-environmental behaviour both 
in and outside of a laboratory setting.  
For a policy field like environmental policy, where stakes are high and challenges such as 
climate change immense, nudging is a promising new addition to the toolbox. It represents 
a cheap and effective means of influencing citizens to act and consume more sustainably, 
conserve energy, use public transport and waste less food. It is backed up by extensive ex-
perimental laboratory research and has been tested successfully in the field. (A non-exhaus-
tive summary of empirical evidence for the effectiveness of two types of green nudges can 
be found in the Annex to this report.) Ends aimed at the common good and environmental 
integrity may justify the means, especially in societies where there is broad support for 
ambitious environmental policies. Questions pertaining to how we can reduce our carbon 
footprint and live more ecologically friendly bother citizens and policymakers alike, and 
nudge theory offers empirical explanations as to why we have such difficulties changing our 
behaviours and lifestyles. Crucially, green nudging also represents a multidisciplinary ap-
proach to environmental policymaking. Insights from the behavioural sciences and psychol-
ogy as well as experimentation using RCTs will likely play an increasingly significant role in 
the future of policymaking. 
Nevertheless, contrary to green nudges, conventional policy instruments are not confronted 
with the type of ethical and psychological concerns that are typically associated with a crit-
ical examination of nudging. The traditional contents of the environmental policy toolbox 
are largely evaluated for their success in protecting environmental goods at the lowest (eco-
nomic) cost to society, and apart from distributional concerns, ethical considerations tend 
to fall by the wayside. This brings us to the second key conclusion of this report.  
(2) A narrow policy evaluation that omits ethical considerations is insufficient for as-
sessing the potential and suitability of green nudging.  
Are nudges manipulative? Do they really retain freedom of choice? Is it fair to make use of 
people’s weaknesses in will and decision making? Should a democratic state be allowed to 
source out policy architecture to a non-elected ‘nudge unit’ staff? Is there a danger of citi-
zens losing their ability to make personal decisions because the state decides what is best 
for them and nudges them in a certain direction? These are among the many questions that 
must be critically addressed before a public authority pursues nudging in earnest. Moreover, 
a critical evaluation of ethical aspects prior to the implementation of each new green nudge 
is crucial. As we have observed, much of the existing literature on green nudging is positively 
biased towards the one-size-fits-all use of nudging for environmental aims. We recommend 
that environmental policymakers perform a complete assessment for each proposed nudge 
prior to its application, using the criteria of efficacy, effectiveness and ethics as a minimum 
standard framework for evaluation. This may imply higher costs related to an otherwise cost-
effective policy tool, but we contend that it is well-invested public money. It is in the pub-
lic’s interest to comprehensively evaluate an instrument that may have negative ethical and 
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political consequences, not least of which being a decrease in trust in government institu-
tions. Especially in times of increasing public scepticism about decision making by politi-
cians, it is important to have a transparent and ethically focused approach to behavioural 
interventions. Otherwise, citizens might, understandably, not see the ‘liberal’ aspect in ‘lib-
ertarian paternalism’ and fail to recognise the potentially beneficial impact of a nudge-
based environmental policy. Finally, it is advisable to review implemented nudges at regular 
time intervals to make sure that no side effects have occurred in the meantime. This would 
also help maintain awareness of a nudge’s existence to avoid the problem of ‘bequeathing’ 
nudges to new generations of policymakers or administrative staff.  
A critical and permanent debate on green nudges is a required step towards finding solutions 
to the ethical and practical concerns outlined in this paper. Hopefully, the evaluative frame-
work developed here can be used by policymakers and practitioners to produce effective 
behavioural interventions that treat citizens with respect by upholding their dignity and 
considering their interests. This is in no way different than how Thaler and Sunstein first 
envisioned the potential of nudges to do good. It is paramount that an on-going discourse 
continues to scrutinise nudges from an ethical standpoint, especially considering the positive 
reception the policy tool has received by governments worldwide and the speed at which it 
is being implemented. 
 
  




8 Annex: Overview of green nudges 
Table 5: Empirical examples of green default nudges 
Reference Behaviour Details of study Effect  





Large scale field experi-
ment (1600 participants) 
Default (opt-out) condition 
led to an average 22.7% in-
crease in willingness to pay 




Vong and Barascud 
(2013) 
Conserving en-
ergy on heating 
and cooling in 
the US 
Medium scale field experi-
ment (87 offices) 
On average a 1.0ºC decrease 
in the default led to a reduc-
tion of 0.38ºC in the chosen 
thermostat setting 




bulbs in the US 
Medium scale online 
choice experiment and 
survey (120-200 partici-
pants) 
Default led to a 23.6%, 22.9% 
and 39% increases in choice 
of more efficient light bulbs 




per at a univer-
sity in Sweden 
Medium scale natural field 
experiment (18 depart-
ments at a major Swedish 
university) 
Default double-sided printing 
led to 15% decrease is paper 
consumption, effect remains 








Large scale online choice 
experiment and survey 
(1200 participants) 
Green energy default led to a 
13% increase in renewable 
energy choice; active choice 
between grey and green en-




waste at hotels 
in Norway 
Large scale field experi-
ment (52 hotels) 
Default plate size led to 








Medium scale field experi-
ment (240 participants) 
No significant impact of de-
fault or active choice on de-








Medium scale choice ex-
periment, online survey 
(475 participants) 
44.6% increase due to default 
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Mixed methods: two natu-
ral experiments (2500 par-
ticipants, 1500000 cus-
tomers); a laboratory 
choice experiments (225 
participants) 
Natural experiment #1: 1669 
out of 1683 meters (99%) stay 
with (default) green provider 
after given the option to 
change  
Natural experiment #2:94% 
stay with default tariff 
Laboratory experiment #1: 
17% increase due to default, 














Medium scale choice ex-
periment (1800 partici-
pants) and field experi-
ment (140 households) 
Choice experiment: 18% in-
crease in smart meter uptake 
in default condition, default 
condition increases the 
chance of smart meter up-
take by 2.65  
Field experiment: default 
(opt-out) condition led to 46% 
increase in smart meter up-
take 
Vetter and 





Medium scale choice ex-
periment (600 partici-
pants) 
Participants four times more 
likely to choose green energy 
under green default 
 
Table 6: Empirical examples of green social norm nudges 
Reference Behaviour Details of study Effect 
Allcott (2011) Residential 
electricity con-
sumption in US  




Average 2% reduction in con-
sumption; 0.62kWh/day 
saved 





sumption in US  
Large scale field experi-
ment (230000 house-
holds); four-year interven-
tion period, longevity of 
nudge was studied after 
half of the treatment 
group stopped the inter-
vention   
Average 1-1.3% immediate re-
duction in consumption; 0.3-
0.4 kWh/day saved, after two 
months this drops to 0.2 
kWh/day; discontinuing 
nudge leads to a decay of ef-
fect by 10-20% per year 
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Reference Behaviour Details of study Effect 
Ayres, Raseman 
and Shih (2013)  
Residential 
electricity con-
sumption in US 
Large scale natural field 
experiment (170000 
households) 
Average 1.2-2.1% reduction in 
consumption 
Brandon and 
Lewis (1999)  
Gas and elec-
tricity con-
sumption in UK 
households 
Large scale field experi-
ment (1000 households) 
4.6% decrease in energy us-




and Tronu (2009)  
Residential re-
cycling behav-
iour in Italy 
Medium scale survey (300 
participants) 
Descriptive local social norms 
correlated with behavioural 
intention (r = 0.49) 
Cialdini, Reno and 
Kallgren (1990) 
Littering in 
public places in 
the US 
Medium scale field experi-
ment (150-400 individuals) 
Multiple experiments: range 




Rhoads and Winter 
(2006) 
Theft of petri-
fied wood from 
a US National 
Park 
Large scale field experi-
ment (2600 individuals) 
No control group. Study 
looked at interaction be-
tween type of norm (i.e. in-
junctive/descriptive) and 
strength (negatively/posi-
tively worded). A strong in-
junctive norm had the great-
est effect: 1.67% theft (pro-
portion of wood pieces sto-
len). Strong descriptive norm 
had least effect: 7.92% 




sumption in US 
Large scale field experi-
ment (85000 individuals) 
Average 2% reduction in con-
sumption (1.7% for conserva-
tives; 2.4% for liberals) 
Dolan and 
Metcalfe (2015)  
Residential 
electricity con-
sumption in UK  
Medium scale field experi-
ment (569 households)  
 




Bonnes (2011)  
Residential re-
cycling behav-
iour in Italy 
Medium scale survey (452 
participants) 
Descriptive local norms pre-
dicted behavioural intention 
mediated by perceived be-
havioural control (R2 = 0.40); 
injunctive norms account for 





in US hotels 
Medium scale field experi-
ment (1058 instances of 
potential towel reuse in 
190 rooms) 
Specific room social norm led 
to a 9% increase in towel re-
use compared to a standard 
environmental message 
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tion in Israel 
Medium scale choice ex-
periment (300 individuals) 
Social norm interventions led 
to an intention to conserve 
energy by 12.1-34.4% com-
pared to a control group (de-




waste in hotel 
restaurants in 
Norway 
Large scale field experi-
ment (52 hotels) 
Social cue intervention led to 
a 20.5% decrease in waste 
Kormos, Gifford 




Medium scale field experi-
ment (78 participants; 
month-long intervention) 
Non-significant main effect of 
social norm on overall sus-
tainable transport behaviour; 
positive linear relation be-
tween sustainable transporta-
tion and strength of descrip-
tive norm; marginally-signifi-









use in France 
Medium scale choice ex-
periment (317 farmers) 
Collective bonus (implicit so-
cial norm) leads to farmers’ 
willingness to accept a bonus 
of 30€/ha/year less than con-







Medium scale laboratory 
experiment (100 partici-
pants) 
Self-set group goal led to 21% 









Medium scale field experi-
ment (91 households) 
Non-significant effect of com-
parative norm; comparative 
norm plus incentive led to re-
ductions of 19.4% for elec-
tricity and 17.5% for gas 
Nigbur, Lyons and 
Uzzell (2010)  
Residential re-
cycling behav-
iour in UK 
Medium scale survey and 
natural experiment (527 
participants) 
Descriptive social norm signif-
icant predictor of intended 








sumption in US 
Medium scale field experi-
ment (290 households) 
Social norm messaging led to 
10% reduction in consumption 
Schultz (1999)  Residential re-
cycling behav-
iour in US  
Medium scale field experi-
ment (120 households) 
Social norm messaging led to 
19% increase in recycling be-
haviour 
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sumption in US 
Medium scale field experi-
ment (270 households) 
Descriptive norm led to de-
crease of 1.22kWh/day for 
more-than-average energy us-
ers; for less-than-average us-
ers it led to a 0.89kWh/day 
increase; boomerang effect 
disappears with inclusion of 
injunctive norm: 2.5% de-
crease for less-than-average 
users and 8.3% for more-than-
average 
Schultz, Khazian 
and Zaleski (2008) 
Reusing towels 
in US hotels 
Large scale field experi-
ment (60 hotels; 800-2300 
guests per experiment) 
Average towels replaced per 
stay 
Experiment #2 
Combined injunctive and de-
scriptive norm: 1.74  
Control group: 2.32  
Experiment #3 
Specific norm: 2.19  
Generic norm: 2.02  
Control group: 2.44  
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